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ABSTRACT 
This thesis compares the performance of the Freedom 
Class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) with five similar 
international frigates and corvettes in a littoral combat 
environment. The alternative ships are: Formidable class 
frigate, Singapore Navy; MILGEM (Milli Gemi) class 
corvette, Turkish Navy; Steregushchiy class frigate, 
Russian Navy; Sigma class corvette, Indonesian Navy; and 
Visby class corvette, Swedish Navy. The study is conducted 
within a fictitious scenario in the Strait of Hormuz, 
countering Iran’s naval capabilities. Hughes’s Salvo 
Equations Model is used to evaluate a variable number of 
friendly combatants versus a fixed opposing force. The 
results identify the number of ships required to dominate 
the threat in the scenario. 
Based on the comprehensive results, including changes 
by adding hardkill and introducing countermeasure 
effectiveness, an optimum design suggestion is made. In the 
end, optimum design is a relative subject because the 
issues of sustainment and cost play a significant role in 
the decision. LCS is shown to be the most combat-effective 
performer, but its cost detracts from its operational 
advantages. MILGEM is a medium size ship with high 
performance and lower cost, making her the most cost-
effective candidate. Visby has the lowest cost and because 
of its stealth can be combat-effective as others, but it is 
not nearly as sustainable. Thus, the decision depends on 
the weight placed on these several factors.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis provides an evaluation and comparison of 
the Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and five other 
similar international frigates and corvettes in a littoral 
combat environment. The alternative ships are: Formidable 
class frigate, Singapore Navy; MILGEM (Milli Gemi) class 
corvette, Turkish Navy; Steregushchiy class frigate, 
Russian Navy; Sigma class corvette, Indonesian Navy; and 
Visby class corvette, Swedish Navy. The evaluation is 
conducted within a fictitious scenario in Strait of Hormuz, 
countering Iran’s naval capabilities to close the Strait. 
Iran’s recent acquisition of indigenously built and 
imported naval capability is a credible threat to freedom 
of navigation in the region.  
The objective is to analyze littoral warship 
alternatives in a scenario that involves a Friendly Force 
(FRIFOR) Squadron against Fast Patrol Boat (FPB), small 
boat, and submarine threats. The main goal is to compare 
the effectiveness of the LCS Squadron to that of the 
squadrons of five other FRIFOR candidate designs. Opposing 
Force (OPFOR) are Iranian Kilo class submarines, Yono class 
midget submarines, Kaman and Thondor Class FPBs and 
numerous classes of small, but fast, missile and torpedo 
boats.  
To evaluate the FRIFOR squadron against the OPFOR in 
terms of weapons exchange, the research methodology uses 
Hughes’s Salvo Equations Model. For each FRIFOR candidate, 
seven types of encounters against OPFOR are modeled, 
resulting in 42 unique encounters. The Salvo Equations 
 xviii
Model produces the Fractional Exchange Ratio (FER). This 
model computes the number of FRIFOR ships to achieve FER 
“parity” of equal fractional losses. The results also 
indicate the number of required ships to achieve 
“dominance” over the OPFOR in each encounter.  
After initial base case encounters are investigated, a 
hardkill capability boost provided to Sigma and Visby is 
considered. Another case introduces countermeasure 
effectiveness to the Salvo Equations to estimate its effect 
on each outcome. Quantifying countermeasure effectiveness 
is not an easy task. The approach employed in this study is 
to answer the question of how much countermeasure 
effectiveness is enough. 
A unique application of the Salvo Equations is the 
surface ship versus submarine encounter, which has not been 
heavily investigated in recent years. This study provides a 
crude first approximation to the encounter and produces 
important insights. Another aspect of the model is that 
helicopters are heavily used in the scenario due to the 
nature of each encounter. This is especially true for LCS 
because helicopters are its sole offensive weapons option.  
The results are enhanced with a sensitivity analysis 
for better understanding. The findings of this thesis 
suggest that 7-10 LCS are required to overcome the multi-
axis threat in the scenario. Using a completely different 
analytical approach, a recent thesis suggests the result of 
6-10 LCS for a similar threat scenario, lending credence to 
the findings of both studies. In the conclusion, the number 
of required ships for each FRIFOR candidate in each 
encounter is aggregated to make recommendations about 
 xix
preferences among the candidates. The issue of cost and 
sustainability are included to evaluate one design against 
another.  
Based on the comprehensive results, including the 
changes of adding hardkill and introducing countermeasure 
effectiveness, an optimum design suggestion is made. In the 
end, optimum design is a relative subject because the 
issues of sustainment and cost play a significant role in 
the decision. LCS is shown to be the most combat-effective 
performer, but its cost detracts from its operational 
advantages. MILGEM is a medium size ship with high 
performance and lower cost, making her the most cost-
effective candidate. Visby, on the other hand, has the 
lowest cost and because of its stealth can be as effective 
as others, but it is not nearly as sustainable. Thus, the 
results are relative and a decision depends on the weight 
placed on these several factors. This thesis may directly 
benefit decision makers who plan future LCS squadron 
operations in support of Carrier Strike Groups or 
Expeditionary Strike Groups, as well as protection of the 
Sea Lanes of Communication in littoral waters. 
 xx
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW  
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the world has 
changed tremendously for the naval warriors. High seas 
engagement of the enemy has faded in importance. New 
warfare types, asymmetric and hybrid warfare, have emerged, 
posing a serious threat to large combatant navies, such as 
the U.S. Navy. To adapt, countries are taking important 
steps to focus on littoral warfare and to battle the new 
threats. In light of these advancements, the U.S. Navy’s 
initiative to build a capable but cost effective ship, in 
terms of budget, weapons and manpower, has given birth to 
first Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), LCS-1 USS Freedom, which 
began sea trials on 28 July 2008, and LCS-2 USS 
Independence, which is due in 2009.  
LCS marked a milestone in U.S. naval ship building 
history, which has been recently influenced by the building 
of Israeli Eilat Class corvette, Swedish Visby Class 
corvette and the Norwegian Skjold Class patrol craft. This 
shift toward a focus on building littoral type ships is due 
to the ever-increasing requirements of operations 
jeopardized by conventional and asymmetric threats in near 
shore and confined waters. These waters include, but are 
not limited to, straits, choke points, and sea bodies full 
of islands and bays. These can harbor and hide surface-to-
surface missile (SSM) carrying Fast Patrol Boats (FPBs), 
small but fast and possibly ship-disabling anti-surface 
weapon-carrying boats, and conventional and midget 
submarines. USS Freedom is designed to combat such 
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adversaries in these environments supporting a Carrier 
Strike Group (CSG) or Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 
(RAND Study, 2007; CRS Report, 2008). As recommended by 
recent theses, deploying LCS with the necessary mission 
packages within a 2-3 LCS Surface Action Group (SAG) or a 
6-10 LCS squadron, depending on mission complexity, is 
required to effectively cover Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), 
Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) and Mine Warfare (MW) missions 
(Abbott, 2008; Milliken, 2009).  
With her multiple helicopter and Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) capabilities, depending on the mission 
package embarked, Freedom Class LCS is a capable fighter in 
littorals. Other navies around the world, however, are also 
adapting to the coastal mission. New German Type 125 class 
frigates will be capable of staying in littorals up to two 
years without returning to home base. Singapore’s new 
Formidable class frigate and the new Indonesian Sigma class 
corvette are typical examples of a capable vessel combating 
against piracy in the Strait of Malacca. A Turkish MILGEM 
corvette, built with indigenous efforts, was launched in 27 
September 2008 and is designed to provide security for the 
Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in the Aegean Sea.  
Russia has built her version of LCS, the Steregushchiy 
Class frigate. The purpose is to create a force of capable 
but smaller size ships, even though they are under the 
protection of other larger warships. Perhaps the most 
shocking design is the Swedish Visby class corvette, which 
introduces a new design for littorals. These represent only 
a few navies introducing new capabilities in the littoral. 
This thesis explores which one is the most suitable for a  
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given scenario. More specifically: How well does LCS 
perform compared to some other designs within the following 
representative scenario? 
B. FICTITIOUS SCENARIO 
In October 2008, Iran inaugurated her newest naval 
base at Jask on the Gulf of Oman, 45 NM east of the 
southern entrance of the Strait of Hormuz (Jane’s 
Intelligence Digest, 2008). It is assessed that the new 
base enhances Iran’s capability to close or block the 
Strait of Hormuz, threatening 40% of the world’s crude oil 
trade (Fish, 2008). In November 2008, the Iranian Navy 
Chief, Rear-Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, publicly confirmed 
(during the commissioning ceremony of Iran’s newest 
indigenous midget submarine and two FPBs) Iran's threat to 
close the Strait of Hormuz in the event of hostilities with 
Israel or any other power (Fish, 2008).   
Iran has long been threatening to shut down the Strait 
regardless of her projected economic losses due to such an 
act. In the wake of Israeli media speeches that are 
revealing potential Israeli air strikes on Iranian Nuclear 
facilities, as well as increased U.S. and multi-national 
exercises and operations that have targeted Iranian Navy 
ships and aircraft in the Persian Gulf, Iran responds to 
the sanctions imposed on her by halting traffic in the 
Strait of Hormuz (Scott, 2008). Iran openly states that no 
traffic is to go through the Strait, East or West bound, 
and that she will target all tanker and merchant vessels 
attempting to navigate the Strait. This also applies to any 
naval vessel trying to encounter Iranian Navy ships 
enforcing this operation. 
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Iranian Navy and Republican Guard naval forces, known 
as IRGN, are already capable of threatening Strait transit 
shipping with the naval assets located in the heart of the 
Strait of Hormuz. The bases include the Main Headquarters 
and the 1st Naval District of the Iranian Navy, Bandar 
Abbas, as well as numerous islands and designated mainland 
naval bases (Jane’s World Navies, 2009). Iranian naval 
assets include, but are not limited to, conventional diesel 
submarines with possible SSM upgrades, midget submarines, 
semi-submersible torpedo boats, conventional missile-
carrying FPBs, and fast small boats carrying short range 
missiles and/or lightweight (324 mm) torpedoes (Fish, 2008; 
Gelfland, 2008; Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2009; Jane’s 
Sentinel Security Assessment, 2009).  
Although existing, to focus the fictitious scenario 
analysis to maritime exchanges, numerous truck-mounted 
mobile SSM land sites, mine threat, and the Iranian Air 
Force are not considered. The Iranian Air Force threat and 
shore-based SSM threat from fixed or mobile sites have been 
eliminated via tactical and CSG Air Wing strikes. In an 
attempt to acquire freedom of navigation, one or two 
Iranian Kilo class submarines have been moved out of the 
Strait to Bandar Beheshti in the Indian Ocean. An MCM 
group, in support of CSG or ESG operations, has already 
cleared all the international waters from the mine threat 
inside the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian Navy’s large 
vessels, such as frigates and corvettes, are obsolete and 
the operational ones were destroyed along with naval air 
assets in previous encounters inside the Persian Gulf. 
(These include Alvand class frigates, Bayandor class 
corvettes, Parvin class patrol boats, P-3 MPAs, Sea King 
 5
and AB 204/212 helicopters.) Therefore, for model 
simplification, only smaller, faster, newer and missile or 
torpedo-carrying Iranian naval assets are taken into 
consideration.  
The scenario begins with increased tensions in the 
Persian Gulf and Iran deciding to challenge shipping in the 
Strait of Hormuz. Currently, an LCS SAG is operating in the 
vicinity of the Strait in support of a CSG or ESG that 
might be in the Persian Gulf or in the Gulf of Oman. Due to 
the heavy tanker traffic through the Strait, an escort or 
Force Protection (FP) mission is needed to provide security 
to High Value Units (HVUs) and to protect oil tankers 
transiting the Strait. In the context of this mission, the 
LCS SAG is reinforced with more ships and this squadron of 
Friendly Forces (FRIFOR) is located in the Strait of 
Hormuz. The purpose is to encounter and neutralize the 
Opposing Forces (OPFOR) that will be approaching from (1) 
mainland Iran (the major naval base Bandar Abbas) and from 
(2) the islands in and around the Strait. The primary 
threats are FPBs, small boats, and submarines.  
C. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
This thesis’ goal is to analyze a scenario that 
involves a FRIFOR Squadron against FPB, small boat and 
submarine threats. The primary objective is to compare the 
effectiveness of the LCS Squadron to that of squadrons of 
five alternate FRIFOR designs. The study primarily focuses 
on answering the following research questions. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 How does a LCS squadron perform compared to other 
selected frigate and corvette designs? 
 In this scenario, how many ships should compose a 
FRIFOR squadron tasked with fighting an Iranian OPFOR of 
small combatants and submarines taking advantage of islands 
and bays? 
 What is the effect of OPFOR submarines on FRIFOR 
performance? 
 Are additional offensive and/or defensive weapons 
capabilities needed for the FRIFOR candidate designs?  
 What is countermeasure effectiveness in this 
littoral scenario? 
 Given that UAVs and/or helicopters are already being 
employed in an ASUW role, how does the lack of SSMs effect 
LCS’s ASUW role against an OPFOR of small combatants?  
 How well will an LCS squadron perform in a scenario 
that involves OPFOR SSM swarm tactics when operating away 
from the SAM umbrella of a CSG or ESG?  
 Are the following attributes of LCS advantages or 
disadvantages in comparison to the other designs? 
o AAW Capability: rapid-fire medium caliber gun, 
Point Defense Missile System (PDMS), but no SAM. 
o ASUW Capability: helicopters’ missile load, but 
no SSM. 
o ASW Capability: helicopters’ torpedo load, but 
no ship-launched torpedo. 
o Size, weight and low signatures compared to 
smaller designs. 
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 How well does LCS compare with alternative designs? 
What may be an improved design for LCS and an optimum 
design for FRIFOR? 
 Are there cost-effective design improvements? 
E. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis addresses capabilities and vulnerabilities 
of smaller combatants in a dangerous littoral environment. 
An analytical model is used to formulate the scenario. The 
model is described in detail and it is followed by the 
combatants in the scenario. The Analysis and Results 
chapter details the breakdown of the Battle of Strait of 
Hormuz. The results and recommendations provide important 
insights for littoral warfighters as well as a basis for 
other scenarios that may be investigated using this model. 
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Salvo Equations, developed by CAPT Wayne Hughes, USN 
(Ret.), are used to compare a weapons exchange of the LCS 
squadron and the Iranian OPFOR (Hughes, 1995). A model 
using Hughes’ Embellished Salvo Equations is implemented 
and the results are analyzed. The OPFOR is heterogeneous 
and the homogenized attributes that factor in the formulas 
have been validated by CAPT Hughes during discussions. This 
research has been realized with the inspiration and 
insights gained from previous works on “An Analysis of 
Small Navy Tactics Using a Modified Hughes’ Salvo Model” by 
Tiah (2007) and “Littoral Combat Vessels: Analysis and 
Comparison of Designs” by Christiansen (2008). 
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G. SIGNIFIANCE OF RESEARCH 
This study directly benefits decision makers who plan 
future LCS SAG/Squadron operations in support of an ESG or 
CSG as well as FP support to commercial shipping. 
Primarily, the strengths and weaknesses of LCS against an 
OPFOR of small, diverse, and capable combatants are 
displayed in the results of the model. Possible 
improvements to the LCS are explored by evaluating 
alternative ship designs within the same scenario. 
Depending on the scenario and the OPFOR attributes, the 
model can be altered. Therefore, it is possible to extend 




II. HUGHES’ SALVO MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides detailed information on the model 
used to formulize the fictitious scenario. Salvo Equations 
have been developed by CAPT Wayne Hughes, USN (Ret.). Basic 
Salvo Equations deal with the representation of a missile 
salvo exchange between warships using SSMs and SAMs 
(Hughes, 1995). Building on the basic Salvo Equations, an 
Embellished Salvo Model is used to compare the FRIFOR and 
the OPFOR. More specifically, the model is designed to 
represent a weapon exchange and defense encounter between 
homogenous forces (Hughes, 1995; Hughes, 2000).   
In this thesis, the OPFOR is heterogeneous and the 
resulting homogenized attributes that factor in the 
formulas were validated by CAPT Hughes during discussions. 
The scenario, which involves submarine versus surface ship 
engagement, provides important insights and this encounter 
has not previously been modeled with the Salvo Equations. 
Also introduced in the Embellished Salvo Equations are the 
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) “leakers” (Hughes, 2000).  
The detailed information on the participants involved in 
the model, the process in choosing their attributes, as 
well as the analysis and results, are displayed in later 
chapters. 
B. EMBELLISHED SALVO EQUATIONS 
The embellished force-on-force equations for combat 
work, achieved by a single weapon salvo fired by a 
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A = number of ships in force A 
B = number of ships in force B 
B  = number of ships in force B out of action from A’s 
salvo 
4b  = Seduction Countermeasure Effectiveness 
1b  = number of hits by A’s missiles needed to put one B 
out of action 
'               (2) 
where, 
 '  = fighting power in hits of an attacking A 
modified for scouting and training deficiencies and the 
effect of defender B’s distraction countermeasure 
effectiveness 
   = Targeting/Scouting Effectiveness of A 
    = Training Effectiveness of A 
    = Distraction Countermeasure Effectiveness of 
side B 
    = number of well-aimed weapons fired by each A 
ship 
33 ' B Bb b           (3) 
where,  
  3 'b  = hits denied to A by defender counterfire of 
B, degraded for defender alertness and training 
deficiencies 
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 B  = Defensive Readiness/Alertness of B 
 3b  = number of well-aimed weapons destroyed by 
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 ' B B A             (5) 
 
33 ' A Aa a           (6) 
 
The corresponding terms and terminology hold for equations 
(4), (5), and (6), i.e., replace A with B ,   with  , and 
vice versa. 
C. DEFINITIONS OF MODEL PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Striking/Offensive Power ( , ) 
 Striking/Offensive power is the number of well-aimed 
weapons fired by each ship in a single salvo. Basic Salvo 
Equations are designed for missile exchange. This thesis, 
however, requires that the offensive weapons represented in 
the Embellished Salvo Equations be short- and long-range 
SSMs and torpedoes. For each encounter and weapons 
exchange, it is assumed that both sides’ offensive weapons 
are within each others’ effective firing range. The number 
of well-aimed weapons is calculated using the number of 
ready-to-fire weapons on board, the Weapon Launch 
Reliability (WLR), and the Weapon Hit Probability (WHP). 
This, therefore, usually results in a non-integer number.  
Striking Power = Number of Weapons * WHP * WLR  (7) 
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The number of weapons is considered the number of 
ready to fire weapons, i.e., 8 Harpoon long-range SSM 
canisters on deck or the number of torpedo tubes on ships 
and submarines. This does not include any possible 
reserves. WLR is the probability that the fired weapon will 
leave its launcher successfully. WHP is the probability 
that the fired weapon will acquire a successful hit at its 
target, where the target’s defense is not taken into 
account. 
For both forces and all ship and weapon types, the WLR 
is assumed 0.9. The WHP assumptions for the weapon types 
are as follows: 
 
Weapon Type WHP 
Torpedoes 0.9 
Short Range SSMs 0.8 
Long Range SSMs 0.7 
Table 1.   Offensive Weapon Hit Probabilities. 
2. Defensive Power ( 3a , 3b ) 
Defensive power is the number of well-aimed weapons 
destroyed by each ship. Basic Salvo Equations factor in the 
SAMs. In this thesis, however, defensive power is 
investigated in depth. This is due to the types (infrared 
(IR), active or semi-active radar homing) or lack of SAMs, 
number of Fire Control (FC) channels, as well as ASW, 
defense against torpedoes. The defensive power of each ship 
is different against each type of weapon. The parameter in 
the formula can be a non-integer number. 
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3. Staying Power ( 1a , 1b ) 
Staying power is the number of hits by opponent’s 
missiles needed to put a ship out of action. In other 
words, this is the number of hits that could be absorbed 
before the Combat Power is reduced to zero. Combat Power is 
defined as striking power minus the target’s defensive 
power. A ship put out of action does not necessarily mean 
it is sunk; rather, it means it is either a neutralized 
threat or a firepower kill. The hits required to put a ship 
out of action linearly diminish her fighting strength. For 
this scenario, staying power is dependent on the type of 
weapon (torpedo or missile) that hits the ship. To restate: 
the staying power of each ship is different against each 
type of weapon and the parameter can be non-integer.  
4. Targeting/Scouting Effectiveness (, B ) 
Targeting/Scouting effectiveness is the degradation of 
striking power measured in hits per salvo. This degradation 
is due to imperfect detection or tracking of enemy targets. 
It could be described as the level of efficiency regarding 
the collection of enemy target information for a successful 
attack. The parameter takes a value between zero and one, 
one being 100% effective. A modern frigate with effective 
radars and organic air asset for scouting should have one 
for targeting effectiveness. This could, however degrade 
due to the target’s nature, e.g., small and hiding behind 
an island.  
5. Defensive Readiness/Alertness ( A , B ) 
Defensive readiness/alertness is the extent to which a 
target ship fails to take defensive actions up to her 
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designed combat potential. This may be due to unreadiness 
or inattention caused by Emission Control (EMCON) or 
condition of readiness. The parameter takes a value between 
zero and one, one being 100% readiness/alertness. A good 
example of low alertness is when the Israeli Eilat Class 
Corvette, INS Hanit, was not 100% ready or alert due to 
operational and intelligence relaxations at the time 
Hezbollah attacked with a truck-mounted C-802 during the 
Israel-Lebanon conflict in 2006. 
6. Training Effectiveness ( , B ) 
 Training effectiveness is the degree to which a firing 
or targeting ship does not reach her designed combat 
potential due to inadequate training, organization or 
motivation. The parameter takes a value between zero and 
one, one being 100% effective. This number could portray 
the level of professionalism of the crew, level of wartime 
training, spare part and equipment technology constraints, 
etc. It could be assumed that the Iranian Navy has a lower 
level of training effectiveness. If not so due to 
professionalism, this is certainly due to some obsolete 
ships and equipment and lack of spare parts. 
7. Seduction Countermeasure Effectiveness ( 4a , 4b ) 
Seduction countermeasure effectiveness is defined as 
the level of effectiveness that causes incoming weapons to 
miss. Thus, it is applied to incoming good shots. When an 
incoming weapon is homing or locked on to a ship, the 
seduction phenomenon diverts the weapon away from the ship. 
This is accomplished by using softkill, a decoy or chaff, 
as well as other features of the ship, such as low 
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observability. Seduction chaff/decoy is assuredly the 
biggest contributor to this parameter. This creates a non-
existing target for the weapon to home in on, i.e., a 
decoy.  
Seduction softkill is a major complementary element to 
conventional hardkill defense, i.e., SAMs. Other 
contributors may include the stealth level, acoustic 
fingerprint, IR signature of the ship design, and on. To 
further enhance this phenomenon, the stealth level, namely 
the Radar Cross Section (RCS) is accounted for. The smaller 
the RCS, the better the chance to deny enemy targeting or 
scouting. Further, if this is combined with a seduction 
softkill, smaller RCS enhances the effectiveness of that 
softkill, urging the locked weapon to change course to the 
non-existing target, which is a fake radar echo. This 
parameter also takes a value between zero and one. This 
time, however, one represents the worst case. This is due 
to the nature of the formulas. For example, a level of 0.85 
would mean 15% of the incoming weapons would miss the ship 
due to seduction countermeasure effectiveness. 
8. Distraction Countermeasure Effectiveness ( A ,  ) 
Distraction countermeasure effectiveness is the level 
of effectiveness that causes enemy shots to miss before 
counterfire, which is the defensive power. The purpose of 
distraction is similar to the seduction phenomenon. The 
timing, however, is different. Distraction happens 
preferably before the enemy fires its weapons and prior to 
the weapon homing on the ship. Certain softkill methods 
create distraction. The attributes of the ship, however, 
also play a significant role.  
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Distraction chaff or creating a fake radar echo, used 
during enemy’s scouting/targeting phase or even after its 
missile is fired, will cause the enemy to target or the 
incoming missile to lock onto the fake radar echo. The ship 
design features mentioned in seduction countermeasure 
effectiveness contribute even more to distraction 
countermeasure. For example, having a smaller RCS in 
situations where the enemy is far away, will tremendously 
minimize or eliminate the enemy’s scouting/targeting 
effort. The enemy may not be able to see the ship on radar 
or, if a contact is present, it may be confused or 
“distracted” about which contact to fire at due to 
insignificant radar echo. 
D. INTRODUCTION OF LEAKERS 
To better represent real scenarios, the introduction 
of leakers into the embellished Salvo Equations was deemed 
necessary. The concept of leakers can be summarized as: no 
matter how effectively a ship’s crew trains and fights and 
regardless of the superiority of her personnel, sensors, 
and weapons, there is an amount of considered leakage from 
the incoming enemy weapons that cannot be taken out by any 
means (Hughes, 2000). A case in point is an AEGIS cruiser 
or destroyer, which has excellent coverage of air space 
with the 3D SPY radar, is armed with numerous SM-2 SAMs, 
and has the maximum capability to reduce the leakers from 
an incoming swarm of cruise missiles, but still cannot 
assuredly eliminate all incoming missiles all the time. 
Note that even if one side has superiority over 
another with 0 ships lost, there still may be some loss due 
to leakers. In the embellished Salvo Equations, leakers are 
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calculated using the following formula and added to the 
number of ships remaining after a salvo exchange. Leakage 
rate is the percentage of the incoming weapons that survive 
defensive counterfire. The resulting value, therefore, is 
usually a non-integer number: 
The number of ships lost to leakers by side A is added 
to :  
Number of Ships Lost to Leakers = 
1
* *   B Leakage Rate
a
  (8) 
Leakage rate for each weapon type is as follows: 
 
Weapon Type Leakage Rate 
Torpedoes 0.15 
Short Range SSMs 0.10 
Long Range SSMs 0.05 
Table 2.   Offensive Weapon Leakage Rates 
E. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
1. Fractional Exchange Ratio (FER) 
The main Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) used in this 
thesis is FER. It compares the fraction of two forces 
destroyed by the other under the supposition that they 
exchange salvos. Mathematically, the ratio of fractional 





           (9) 
FER indicates who wins the salvo exchange or if there 
is parity with some losses on both sides due to leakers. 
When FER is greater than one, side A has reduced B by a 
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greater fraction than B has reduced A. Thus, in a sense, A 
has won because it will have surviving units when B is 
annihilated. When FER is less than one, side B has the 
advantage of the exchange. If FER is between zero and one, 
B wins, and, if FER is greater than one, A wins. If FER is 
one, parity is achieved. The use of FER as a MOE is further 
discussed in later chapters.  
2. Remaining Units after a Salvo Exchange 
After a salvo exchange, the number of ships out of 
action is calculated from the embellished Salvo Equations. 
Naturally, the number of ships put out of action has a 
lower bound of zero and an upper bound of the initial 
number of ships. Therefore, the equations have been 
tailored to provide results within the above-described 
bounds. Ships put out of action subtracted from the initial 
number of ships results in the remaining ships, which, 
along with FER, is used as the second MOE. This thesis 
looks into encounters and reveals the number of required 
ships to achieve a Breakpoint and Dominance. To this 
purpose, a fixed number of side B OPFOR ships is used 
against a variable number of side A FRIFOR ships: 
Breakpoint and Dominance are described as follows: 
a.  Breakpoint 
Breakpoint for side A is achieved when the number 
of remaining A units is strictly greater than the number of 
remaining B units. 
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b.  Dominance 
Dominance for side A is achieved when the number 
of A units lost is minimized and the number of remaining A 
units is strictly greater than the number of remaining B 
units, which is zero. 
F. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
An embellished Salvo Equations Model with multiple 
aspects has been implemented using Microsoft Office Excel 
spreadsheet software based on the basic modeling techniques 
used by Christiansen (2008). Embellished Salvo Equation 
attributes, and other parameters, are inputted into the 
file. The input spaces are designed as variables. After a 
salvo exchange, the results are displayed, namely the FER 
and the remaining units on both sides. A separate file 
graphs FER and remaining units from each side, obtained by 
fixing the number of OPFOR units and varying the number of 
FRIFOR units. From these graphs, the number of FRIFOR ships 
required for Breakpoint and Dominance are obtained. These 
resulting numbers provide an overall conclusion about the 
scenario and answer the research questions. The scenario is 
specified in greater detail in the following chapter.  
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III. SCENARIO PARTICIPANTS 
A. FRIENDLY FORCE SCENARIO 
This thesis’ scenario is an encounter of U.S. ships 
and Iranian forces in the Strait of Hormuz. However, its 
littoral environment is easily applicable to many other 
regions, nations, and non-governmental organizations around 
the world. The scenario’s outcome is to depict littoral 
warfare operations in a confined area where there are 
numerous islands and bays that provide havens for small 
boat operations. These operations are deadly for many 
conventional ships. Navies around the world, therefore, are 
adopting smaller, lighter, cheaper, yet stealthier and 
capable ships to overcome multi-axis threats. These are 
mostly asymmetric and do not occur in blue waters.  
USS Freedom, or LCS, compared to destroyers or 
cruisers, is considered a capable candidate for this job 
with her numerous air assets, lower signatures, and 
proposed lower cost (CRS Report, 2008). However, is LCS the 
best design, or could another ship provide similar or 
better performance at lower cost? This scenario considers 
LCS and five other international ship designs. As 
discussed, this scenario places a FRIFOR of a LCS squadron 
within the Strait of Hormuz in support of CSG-ESG 
operations in the Persian Gulf. The scenario calls for Iran 
to announce the closure of the Strait to all commercial 
traffic in response to a perceived threat from Israel. 
Hostilities commence when the U.S. and the allies challenge 
the closure. Concurrent allied operations have eliminated  
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the Iranian Air Force, shore-based SSM, and mine threats. 
What remains at the scenario start is a robust Iranian 
littoral threat. 
Eleven types of Iranian naval vessels are considered. 
Each carries missiles or torpedoes including one carrying 
both. There are two classes of conventional and midget subs 
(both carrying torpedoes); two classes of missile carrying 
FPBs; three classes of fast missile boats; and four classes 
of fast torpedo boats. With the exception of submarines, 
they are all very fast. Except for the FPBs and the Kilo 
class submarines, they are all fairly new and assumed to be 
problem-free (Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2009). Larger classes 
of ships are either obsolete or assumed to have been 
previously destroyed. Non-missile or torpedo-carrying boats 
are not applicable to the scenario, since they are in-shore 
players and, away from shore, pose no lethal threat. 
FRIFOR ships are composed of a LCS SAG. To form a 
squadron level Task Force, soon the SAG will be reinforced 
by other LCSs. This Task Force will be positioned inside 
the Strait around the strategic Iranian naval bases. They 
will be ready to neutralize adversarial Iranian ships that 
are intent upon attacking traffic transiting through the 
Strait. As before, East-West traffic is to continue 
transiting the Strait. The shipping lanes, however, are 
shifted further south, just off the territorial water lines 
of Oman and U.A.E. This is to keep the traffic away from 
the attackers’ target acquisition range. FRIFOR ships 
operate inside a buffer zone between Iranian bases and the 
shipping lanes. 
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At first, the FRIFOR squadron will be comprised only 
of LCSs. After this engagement is modeled, five other 
candidate frigates and corvettes take LCS’s place and are 
modeled. The results are displayed and each candidate ship 
is compared and evaluated. 
B. FRIENDLY FORCE CANDIDATES 
For model simplification, each candidate is assumed to 
use the MH-60R Seahawk helicopter, or a variant, as the 
helicopter type, allowing the focused comparison of ships, 
not the aircraft. Detailed information on FRIFOR candidate 
ship designs has been compiled from the websites of Jane’s 
Fighting Ships (2009) and Naval Technology (2009) and is in 
Appendix A. Model Assumptions are in the next chapter. The 
following two tables represent general characteristics and 
weapon capabilities of the FRIFOR candidate designs. It is 
assumed that all ships have sonar capability for ASW. 
 
Class Year Length Draft Weight Speed Crew 
Freedom 2008 115.3 m. 3.9 m. 3089 t. 45 Kts. 50 
Formidable 2007 114.0 m. 5.0 m. 3200 t. 27 Kts. 86 
MILGEM 2011 99.0 m. 3.8 m. 2000 t. 29 Kts. 93 
Steregushchiy 2007 104.5 m. 3.7 m. 2200 t. 26 Kts. 100 
Sigma 2007 90.7 m. 3.6 m. 1692 t. 28 Kts. 80 
Visby 2006 73.0 m. 2.4 m. 620 t. 35 Kts. 43 







Class SSM SAM PDMS Gun CIWS Torpedo 
Freedom - - 21 57 mm - - 
Formidable 8 32 - 76 mm - 6 
MILGEM 8 - 21 76 mm - 4 
Steregushchiy - - 8 100 mm 4 8 
Sigma 4 - 8 76 mm - 6 
Visby 8 - - 57 mm - 4 
Table 4.   Ship Weapons Capabilities. 
1. Freedom Class LCS 
The first candidate for the Task Force is USS Freedom. 
Since the tri-hull USS Independence has essentially the 
same capabilities as USS Freedom, she will not be 
considered as a separate alternate. Freedom is a medium 
size frigate, with significant stealth features and lower 
signatures built for littoral warfare operations. The main 
characteristics of the ship include mission packages to be 
carried based on the required mission. Depending on the 
mission package, two organic aircraft embarkation schemes 
are available: two MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, or one MH-
60R Seahawk, and three MQ-8B Fire Scout UAVs.  
LCS has no SSMs and must rely on the ASUW mission 
package component weapons: Seahawk helicopters in an ASUW 
role carrying AGM-114 Hellfire missiles to provide surface 
weapons. Similarly, the ship has no torpedoes and relies on 
the ASW mission package component weapons: Seahawk 
helicopters in an ASW role carrying Mk-54 torpedoes. SAM 
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capability is limited to RAM (Rolling Airframe Missile) 
PDMS. Although LCS lacks ship-borne weapons, except for a 
superb dual-purpose deck gun, her two helicopters are a 
significant feature and will have an impact on the outcome 
in LCS encounters. Open-source intelligence suggests that 
the unit cost of an LCS is approx. $400 million. Recently, 
however, this seems likely to increase.  
2. Formidable Class Frigate 
An alternative to the LCS is the newly built 
Singaporean Navy Formidable Class frigate built for 
operations in the Strait of Malacca and the South China 
Sea. It is also a medium-size frigate with great stealth 
features. Formidable is designed based on French naval 
technology and enhanced with Singapore’s indigenous 
efforts. Formidable is a typical frigate with a full 
weapons suite and one Seahawk. Open-source intelligence 
suggests that the unit cost of a Formidable is 
approximately $300 million. 
3. Milli Gemi (MILGEM) Class Corvette 
Turkish Navy ship building efforts have produced the 
Milli Gemi (National Ship) or MILGEM corvette in 2008. 
Basically a smaller version of Formidable in many aspects, 
MILGEM is considered a large corvette built with mainly 
indigenous efforts. This includes the Command and Control 
(C2) system. The difference between MILGEM and Formidable, 
other than the obvious size, weight, and price, is that 
MILGEM relies on RAM PDMS for AAW, similar to the LCS. 
Otherwise, both hold the same low signatures and stealth 
features as well as the same Seahawk helicopter. Built for 
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operations mainly in the Aegean Sea and Eastern 
Mediterranean, a MILGEM unit cost, based on open-source 
intelligence, is predicted to be approximately $200 
million. 
4. Steregushchiy Class Frigate (Russian LCS) 
Also known as the Russian LCS, Steregushchiy, although 
built for the same purpose, differs from the LCS in design 
and operational responsibilities. Built as part of the 
traditional Russian fleet, where every ship has a different 
significant duty, Steregushchiy is not quite as independent 
a player as Freedom. For analysis purposes, however, she is 
considered a candidate as a new ship with a goal towards 
littoral warfare operations. Steregushchiy lacks SSMs, but 
does have torpedo launchers as well as one Seahawk-like 
aircraft. Design features are relatively poor compared with 
other classes, but she represents a conventional light 
frigate built for littoral operations. Open-source 
intelligence suggests that the unit cost of the export 
version of a Steregushchiy is approximately $150 million. 
Although the Steregushchiy is less expensive than other 
alternatives, the MOE is the number of required ships. 
Therefore, unit cost is a relative issue mainly influenced 
by the differences in the technology and the market of 
shipbuilding countries.  
5. Sigma Class Corvette 
In an effort to modernize its navy, Indonesia has 
recently built Sigma Class corvettes in Dutch shipyards. 
Similar to the purpose of Formidable, Sigma corvettes are 
to provide maritime security in Strait of Malacca and 
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Southeast Asia. A typical corvette, Sigma has a full 
weapons suite. Her air defense, however, relies on a less 
effective PDMS. The main difference between this corvette 
and other alternatives is its inability to house a 
helicopter in a hangar due to size. Although lacking this 
capability reduces the cost and manpower, it decreases the 
ship’s performance due to the type of the helicopter and 
the helicopter’s reduced endurance during foul weather 
conditions. Due to her lack of a hangar, smaller size, and 
other constraints, it is assumed that Sigma is to carry a 
Seahawk-like variant, precisely the same helicopter but 
with less Hellfire and Mk-54 load. Open-source intelligence 
suggests that the unit cost of a Sigma is approximately 
$200 million.  
6. Visby Class Corvette 
Built for Baltic Sea operations against an obvious 
threat, the Swedish Visby is doubtless one of the world’s 
few fully stealth-capable ships that is actively 
operational. Smaller in displacement and length than the 
other candidates, it is foreseen as an extremely capable 
asset in littoral operations. Of all the candidates, Visby 
has the best stealth features. Although she lacks an AAW 
capability, she relies on the stealth and the same gun that 
LCS has for defense. Similar to Sigma, with no hangar for 
helicopter, she supports one helicopter of a Seahawk 
variant. Open-source intelligence suggests that the unit 
cost of a Visby is approximately $200 million.  
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C. OPPOSING FORCE THREAT ASSESSMENT AND ASSUMPTIONS 
According to worldwide intelligence centers, the navy 
is Iran’s most strategically important military service 
(Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 2009). The Iranian 
Navy is rebuilding and modernizing itself along with Iran’s 
other programs focusing on nuclear weapons and long-range 
ballistic missile building efforts. As most of Iran’s oil 
exports and trade pass through the Strait of Hormuz, the 
vital importance of the Persian Gulf for Iran is an obvious 
reason for its effort to modernize the navy after the Iran-
Iraq war (Ripley, 2008). Iran’s technology transfer from 
China, North Korea, and Russia is well known. In addition, 
its indigenous shipbuilding efforts have, in recent years, 
proven fruitful (Fish, 2008; Gelfland, 2008).   
Along with Iran’s efforts towards building long-range 
ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles based on Chinese 
technology pose a significant threat in the Persian Gulf. 
Chinese C-802 missiles are claimed to be a reverse-
engineered Exocet missile (Federation of American 
Scientists, 2009; Global Security.Org, 2009). They have 
been re-engineered by Iran and put into service as upgrades 
to their navy’s aged and unmaintained Harpoon missiles. The 
missiles have also been placed onto the new fast missile 
boats that were built in Iran. Besides the C-802, short-
range Chinese SSMs, C-701 or FL-10s, are also re-engineered 
in Iran. These are becoming the main assault weapons of the 
newly built fast (50 knots or over) and small boats (Jane’s 
Fighting Ships, 2009).  
The new Iranian small boats, with almost no RCS and 
very high speeds, pose a significant threat to FRIFOR 
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operating close to Iranian shores in the Strait of Hormuz. 
Although these boats do not carry long-range SSMs, their 
local knowledge of the waters and high-speed capabilities 
give them the advantage in delivering their short-range 
SSMs at required distances. As mentioned, some of these 
boats are not missile-capable, but are torpedo-capable. 
Although Iran’s capability to deliver a torpedo strike is 
uncertain, the effect of a torpedo hit due to its heavy 
warhead makes it a serious threat. The fact that some of 
these boats are semi-submersible brings the possibility of 
OPFOR boats approaching closer distances undetected. 
1. Iranian Naval Force Review 
Table 5 outlines the Iranian Navy OPFOR surface and 
sub-surface capability. Large naval assets, such as 
frigates, corvettes, amphibious ships, auxiliary ships and 
all obsolete ships are excluded. Naval air assets and small 
inshore boats with no missile or torpedo capability are 
also excluded. It is an assumption that either the Iranian 
Navy’s obsolete assets will pose almost no threat or the 
bigger ships will have already been taken out in previous 
operations and aircraft strikes. The remaining forces from 
the Iranian Navy include the submarines and the smaller, 
newer and faster boats with lethal weapons. Iranian Caspian 
Fleet vessels are also not considered. After careful 
consideration of the strength of the Iranian Navy based on 
the latest intelligence from open sources, it is assumed 
that the Iranian Navy’s lethal combatant strength is within 
the following classes and numbers shown in Table 5. 
Detailed information regarding each class is compiled from 
the websites of Jane’s Fighting Ships (2009), Federation of 
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American Scientists (2009) and Global Security.Org (2009) 














3 x Kilo 10 x Kaman 10 x Mk 13 10 x Tir 
5 x Yono 10 x Thondor 5 x C-14 15 x Peykaap I 
  25 x Peykaap II 3 x Kajami 
   3 x Gahjae 
Table 5.   Iranian Naval Forces Strength. 
2. Iranian Naval Bases 
Iran has numerous operational naval bases that control 
the entire Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and outside the 
Gulf of Oman. After careful consideration of the open 
source intelligence concerning Iranian naval bases, their 
locations, operational status, and Google Earth imagery, it 
is deduced that Iran has the operational naval bases shown 
in Table 6 (Jane’s World Navies, 2009; Jane’s Fighting 












Bandar Abbas* Bandar Lengeh* Qeshm Island* Larak Island* 
Bushehr Bandar 
Beheshti 




Kharg Island Sirri Island** 
  Khorramshahr  
Table 6.   Iranian Naval Bases.  
* These naval bases are located inside the Strait 
of Hormuz. 
** These naval bases are located just outside of 
the Strait. 
 
Bandar Abbas is the largest and most strategically-
located naval base in Iran. It sits on the mainland in the 
north of the Strait of Hormuz, just over 30 NM from the 
center of the shipping lanes. It is the headquarters of the 
Iranian Navy and responsible for the 1st Naval District. A 
major portion of Iranian shipbuilding facilities and 
dockyards are located here as well as many major naval 
assets. Kilo class submarines are known to be stationed in 
Bandar Abbas. Recently, however, it was decided to move 
them to Bandar Beheshti where they can reach high seas 
without obstruction. The second largest base is Bushehr. It 
is located on the mainland in the middle of Persian Gulf 
and is responsible for 2nd Naval District. 
Another large base is Bandar Lengeh, which controls 
the Persian Gulf entrance of the Strait. As previously 
mentioned, Bandar Beheshti is the newly-designated 
 32
submarine base in the Gulf of Oman. Bandar Khomeini is 
located in the oil-rich Basra region. 
Of the medium-sized bases, the most important is Qeshm 
Island, which is strategically located inside the Strait of 
Hormuz. It is an island practically connected to the 
mainland and it forms an extension deep into the Strait. 
Jask is the newest naval base on the Gulf of Oman entrance 
of the Strait and it is built to better control shipping 
lanes. Kharg Island is an island base located in a major 
offshore oil region in the middle of the Persian Gulf. 
Lastly, Khorramshahr, located in the Basra region, sits on 
the border of Iraq. 
The three small island bases are typical piers 
designed to support small naval assets. Larak Island is 
right in the Strait’s heart and Abu Musa Island, although 
disputed by U.A.E., is in the western entrance of the 
Strait. Sirri Island is just outside the Strait and further 
west from the previous two islands. 
3. Iranian Naval Base Asset Allocation 
Considering the Iranian oil drilling and processing 
sites, major trade routes, geopolitically important 
strategic locations, such as the Strait of Hormuz, the 
ongoing U.S. and coalition exercises and operations in and 
outside of the Persian Gulf, it is assumed that the 
strength of the Iranian Navy is distributed as depicted in 
Table 7. This assumption is made after current known 
locations of the Iranian Naval assets, excluding the 
Caspian Fleet, have been investigated using open-source 
intelligence, i.e., Google Earth. It is understood that 
this assumption is only for analytical purposes and is 
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subject to major debate regarding where the Iranian 
administration and Naval leaders would choose to locate 
their naval assets if this scenario were to transpire. 
 
Naval Base Submarines PGFG PTG PTF 
Bandar Abbas 2xKilo 
3xYono 
6xKaman 2xPeykaap II  
Bushehr 2xYono 4xKaman 2xPeykaap II  










 2xThondor 2xMk 13 
2xPeykaap II 
 





Jask   2xMk 13 
2xPeykaap II 
2xPeykaap I 




Khorramshahr   2xPeykaap II 2xPeykaap I 









Sirri Island   2xPeykaap II 2xTir 
2xPeykaap I 
2xGahjae 
Table 7.   Iranian Naval Base Asset Allocation.  
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D. OPPOSING FORCE SCENARIO 
In this section, the OPFOR operational plans and 
FRIFOR scenario merge together and create the modeled 
scenario. There are a total of seven Iranian bases in and 
around the Strait of Hormuz. The total number of assets 
allocated to these bases is 64 ships. Inside the Strait of 
Hormuz, there are three centrally located Iranian Bases. 
Two other bases are on the western Persian Gulf entrance of 
the Strait, as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Strait of Hormuz and Vicinity, after Microsoft 
Encarta. 
To focus the scenario and the model into a higher-
resolution geographic area, two bases, Sirri Island and 
Jask, have been omitted from the OPFOR scenario. As a 
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result, only five bases with a total number of 50 allocated 
assets are considered. This includes primarily Bandar 
Abbas, Qeshm Island, Larak Island, Bandar Lengeh and Abu 
Musa Island. The first three bases are located in the 
central Strait; the latter two are on the west, as depicted 
in Figure 2. Detailed high resolution Google Earth pictures 
of these five bases that display piers and ships have been 
investigated closely to understand the OPFOR Order of 
Battle. 
 
Figure 2.   Scenario Naval Bases in Strait of Hormuz, after 
Microsoft Encarta. 
Based on the locations of the bases, Iranian Naval 
Forces are divided into two groups. Therefore, the threat 
to FRIFOR is expected from two different areas: the Central 
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Strait area, with three bases that hold 32 Iranian naval 
assets, and the western Strait area, with two bases that 
hold 18 assets. Considering this geographical separation, 
the engagements modeled by Hughes’ Salvo Equations are 
assumed to occur in two different places simultaneously. 
FRIFOR Squadron is to be divided into two groups. This 
allows an encounter with two OPFOR groups.  
The engagements are to take place in the following 
order. The first attackers from Iranian bases will be the 
submarines. When hostilities start, the Kilo Class 
submarines are expected to be in the central part of the 
Strait ready to sink any tanker, merchant, or any enemy 
naval vessel. The second wave of attackers is expected to 
be the FPBs. After the larger ships of the Iranian Navy 
have been destroyed, FPBs remain the largest of the OPFOR 
ships. They all have C-802 long-range SSMs. When the 
hostilities commence, they are expected to encounter the 
FRIFOR squadron following their submarines.  
The expected third wave is the Yono Class midget 
submarines. Because of their small size and shore support 
dependence, they are not expected in open seas, but pose a 
threat in the Strait. The remainder attacker waves include 
PTGs with short range SSMs and PTFs with lightweight 
torpedoes. These two groups of boats are fast, but, since 
they are very small, they are restricted to the inshore 
zone. Therefore, they will be the last two waves of 
attackers as the FRIFOR squadron proceeds forward towards 
the Iranian mainland. PTFs attack last, as they are 
considered the Iranian Navy’s last resort since they only 
fire torpedoes and need to be close to their targets.  
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Summarizing, there are two engagement regions and a 
total of five waves of attackers. The Salvo Model is to 
reveal the number of FRIFOR ships needed for Breakpoint and 
Dominance for each encounter given the number of OPFOR. 
Therefore, FRIFOR is divided into two squadrons and the 
force sizes become model variables. The OPFOR is assumed to 
be structured into the following Task Force (TF) and Task 
Groups (TG). TF 480, composed of five TGs and a total of 32 
ships, operates out of Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and 
Larak Island. TF 490, composed of 3 TGs and 18 ships, 
operates out of Bandar Lengeh and Abu Musa Island. Table 8 
shows the OPFOR Order of Battle which operates from five 
bases within two TFs. 
 
TF 480 Units TF 490 Units 
TG 480.01 SSK 
2 X Kilo 
TG 490.01 PGFG 
4 x Thondor 
TG 480.02 PGFG 
6 x Kaman 
TG 490.02 PTG 
3 x C-14 
5 x Peykaap II 
TG 480.03 SSC 
3 x Yono 
TG 490.03 PTF 
2 x Tir 
2 x Peykaap I 
2 x Kajami 
1 x Gahjae 
TG 480.04 PTG 
2 x Mk 13 
2 x C-14 
6 x Peykaap II 
  
TG 480.05 PTF 
4 x Tir 
5 x Peykaap I 
2 x Kajami 
  
Table 8.   OPFOR Order of Battle.  
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E. OPPOSING FORCE ASSETS 
Detailed information on each class of OPFOR ships and 
their weapons is in Appendix B. For modeling purposes, all 
PTGs are assumed to carry Iranian C-701 Kosar short-range 
SSMs built based on Chinese technology, although some carry 
the similar Chinese FL-10s. All PTGs and PTFs have speeds 
of 50 knots or over, weights of 30 tons or less, and 
lengths of 21 meters or less. 
1. Kilo (Project 877 EKM) Class Submarine (SSK) 
 The Iranian Navy has three Russian-built Kilo-class 
conventional submarines. Although it is reported that these 
submarines underwent major refit under Russia’s 
supervision, including the addition of Russian ASCMs, this 
update is not confirmed and is omitted from the model 
(Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems, 2009). A typical diesel 
submarine, Kilo-class carries 18 heavyweight (533 mm) 
torpedoes. The submarines’ mine-laying capability is not 
considered in the model. Reports of their transfer to base 
in the Gulf of Oman have been confirmed but, for the sake 
of the scenario’s applicability to the rest of the world 
and to increase the number of threat axis, two Kilo class 
boats are included in the model.  
2. Yono (IS 120) Class Coastal Submarine (SSC) 
Based on North Korean midget submarine technology, the 
recently-built five Yono class boats are very small and 
shore-support dependent. They are designed for littoral 




considered to be built as covert weapons to strike vessels 
in the Strait of Hormuz (Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems, 
2009).  
3. Kaman (Combattante II) Class FPB (PGFG) 
Built in the late 1970s and early 1980s in France and 
recently in Iran, these 13 ships are the stronger half of 
the main missile force on which the Iranian Navy relies on 
during a conflict in their territory. Having been 
maintained and their weapons upgraded to include four C-
802s, they pose a serious threat to any vessel operating in 
or around the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has built the last 
three with indigenous efforts. They are, however, based in 
the Caspian Sea. 
4. Thondor (Houdong) Class FPB (PGFG) 
Ten Thondor class FPBs were built by China in the 
1990s and, along with Kaman class FPBs, they form the long-
range SSM capable force of the Iranian Navy. Armed with 
four C-802s, they are another formidable threat facing 
FRIFOR.  
5. Mk 13 Class Patrol Boat (PTG) 
Built by China, ten Mk 13 boats were recently 
delivered to Iran, armed with two FL-10 short-range SSMs 
and two lightweight torpedoes. For modeling consistency, 
FL-10s and lightweight torpedoes are assumed equivalent to 
C-701 short-range SSMs. 
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6. C-14 Class Patrol Boat (PTG) 
Similar to Mk 13, the Chinese built C-14s carry four 
Fl-10 missiles. Nine were delivered starting early in the 
2000s; five are missile-capable and the rest are designed 
as inshore craft. 
7. Peykaap II (IPS 16 Mod) Class Patrol Boat (PTG) 
Twenty-five Peykaap II boats are believed to have been 
recently built by Iran based on a North Korean design. 
Carrying two C-701 SSMs, Peykaap II is a design-improvement 
of the original Peykaap I. Due to the large number of this 
class, they pose a serious threat. Small but fast, they are 
capable boats with very small RCS due to stealthy design. 
8. Tir (IPS 18) Class Patrol Boat (PTF) 
Another North Korean design, ten Tir-class boats were 
delivered by North Korea in the early 2000s. Carrying two 
heavyweight torpedoes in an anti-ship role, Tir certainly 
increases the dimension of the threat. 
9. Peykaap I (IPS 16) Class Patrol Boat (PTF) 
Fifteen Peykaap I boats were delivered together with 
the Tir-class boats. They carry two lightweight torpedoes 
for ship-disabling role. Their stealthy design features are 
significant. 
10. Kajami Class Semi-Submersible Boat (PTF) 
Originally North Korean Taedong-B design high-speed 
infiltration craft, three of this class were delivered 
together with Tir-class boats. Very little is known about 
the design. The concept of operations is likely to include 
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high-speed surface approach to a target before submerging 
to a depth of approximately three meters to conduct a 
torpedo attack using a snort mast. 
11. Gahjae Class Semi-Submersible Boat (PTF) 
Similar to Kajami, and originally the North Korean 
Taedong-C design semi-submersible torpedo boat, three of 
these boats were delivered together with Tir-class boats. 
Gahjae is based on the Peykaap design and the concept of 
operations is identical to the Kajami class. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. FRIENDLY FORCE MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This section outlines the assumptions and limitations 
of the FRIFOR candidates considered in the model. To 
determine model parameters, certain assumptions had to be 
made to allow for ship capability comparisons. The 
helicopter to be used for all candidates is the MH-60R 
Seahawk. The assumption for the Seahawk weapon load is 
either eight Hellfire missiles or four Mk-54 torpedoes. Due 
to their limited size, capacity and lack of hangar, Sigma 
and Visby carry a lighter weight Seahawk-like variant. The 
weapon load for this variant is either four Hellfire 
missiles or two MK-54 torpedoes. Against PTGs and PTFs, 
only helicopter-launched Hellfires are used. This is 
because using Harpoon-like ship-launched long-range SSMs 
against small boats is not reasonable due to cost and 
target-allocation schemes. 
Defensive power values of the candidates against the 
enemy SSMs are detailed in Appendix C. For all candidates, 
defensive power is assumed to be two against the 
submarines, due to their limited defense against torpedoes, 
and three against the PTFs. The latter are easier to defend 
against than submarines. The staying power of all 
candidates against submarine-launched heavyweight torpedoes 
is one. Staying power value decisions of the candidates 
against the rest of the enemy weapons are detailed in 
Appendix C.  
For modeling purposes, the Hellfire missiles fired 
from FRIFOR helicopters and the C-701s fired from PTGs are 
 44
considered equivalent weapons. Similarly, the FRIFOR long-
range SSMs (Harpoon, Exocet or RBS) are considered to be 
equivalent to enemy C-802s. In the ship versus submarine 
encounters, all the torpedoes, ship or helicopter-launched 
and submarine-launched, are also considered equivalent.  
During encounters, the offensive weapons used by the 
opposing sides are not necessarily equivalent. For example, 
LCS fights against all enemy surface ships with helicopter-
launched Hellfires; however, the PGFGs return fire with C-
802s, PTGs return fire with C-701s, and PTFs return fire 
with lightweight torpedoes. The model inputs are made to 
take this into consideration for defensive and staying 
power. Therefore, not all encounters are homogenous. When a 
heterogeneous battle occurs, the inputs are made to take 
into account who is firing what against whom. The details 
of model input parameters for every encounter and the rest 
of the Salvo Model parameters for the FRIFOR candidates are 
discussed in later sections.  
For modeling purposes, the LCS mission package concept 
is not fully taken into account. Against the submarines, 
LCS has the ASW mission package on board, specifically two 
helicopters. When the threat changes to surface, the ASUW 
mission package is in effect, with both helicopters or one 
helicopter and UAVs, depending on the threat type, PTG/PTF 
or PGFG respectively. This transition is assumed to occur 
successfully after each encounter in between waves of OPFOR 
attackers. During the encounters where helicopters are 
employed, they are assumed in the air before the salvo 
exchange commences. They are refueled after each encounter. 
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Also after each encounter, the ship and helicopter weapons 
are reloaded. For FRIFOR, every new encounter starts fresh. 
1. Freedom Class LCS 
In LCS engagements, along with two helicopters, UAVs 
are used in scouting and targeting, but not in a weapon-
delivery role. LCS has no ship-borne striking power (SSMs 
or torpedoes). LCS operates two helicopters in the air for 
the ASW role making her striking power eight torpedoes and 
two helicopters for the ASUW role, against PTG and PTFs, 
for a striking power of 16 Hellfires. Against the PGFGs, it 
is assumed that LCS should operate only one helicopter with 
a striking power of 8 Hellfires. This is due to the larger 
caliber guns on PGFGs that can target the helicopters 
within the Hellfire firing range. LCS defensive power is 
nine against the SSM firing enemy. This is a sum of the 21 
cell RAM launcher and a capable rapid-firing 57 mm gun. 
Staying power against lightweight torpedoes and long-range 
SSMs is 1.9 and against short-range SSMs is 2.9 due to the 
difference in warhead sizes. As mentioned, staying and 
defensive power explanations for FRIFOR ships are in 
Appendix C. 
2. Formidable Class Frigate 
Since Formidable is more of a conventional frigate in 
terms of weapon load, she uses helicopter and/or ship-
launched weapons, depending on each encounter. In an ASW 
role, six ship-launched and four air-launched torpedoes 
makes a total of 10 for striking power. Against the PGFGs, 
the striking power is eight Harpoons. Against the small 
boats, PTGs and PTFs, the striking power is also eight. In 
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these encounters, however, Formidable uses helicopter-
launched Hellfires. Defensive power is nine against the SSM 
firing enemy for a sum of 32 VLS Aster SAMs and a 76 mm 
gun. Staying power against lightweight torpedoes and long 
range SSMs is 1.9 and short range SSMs is 2.9. 
3. MILGEM Class Corvette 
MILGEM’s striking power is identical to Formidable 
except the number of torpedo tubes on board is four, which 
makes the ASW striking power eight. Defensive power is 
eight against the SSM firing enemy, a sum of 21-cell RAM 
and a 76 mm gun. Staying power against lightweight 
torpedoes and long range SSMs is 1.5 and short range SSMs 
is 2.3. 
4. Steregushchiy Class Frigate 
Like the LCS, Steregushchiy has no SSMs on board, 
making the only offensive missile the air-launched Hellfire 
with a striking power of eight. ASW role striking power is 
12 torpedoes, which is a sum of eight tubes on the ship and 
four torpedoes on the helicopter. Defensive power is 7.7 
against a SSM firing enemy, composed of four 30 mm CIWS, 
eight short-range IR SAMs and a 100 mm gun. Staying power 
against lightweight torpedoes and long range SSMs is 1.6 
and short range SSMs is 2.5. 
5. Sigma Class Corvette 
Sigma has six torpedo tubes and, combined with the 
helicopter’s two torpedoes, her ASW striking power becomes 
eight. In an ASUW role against PGFGs, the striking power 
becomes four Exocet SSMs on board and, against the small 
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boats, it becomes four Hellfires from the helicopter. 
Defensive power is three against the SSM firing enemy, 
composed of eight short-range SAMs and a 76 mm gun, as 
explained in Appendix C. Staying power against lightweight 
torpedoes and long-range SSMs is 1.4 and short range SSMs 
is 2.1. 
6. Visby Class Corvette 
Visby has an ASW striking power of six torpedoes, four 
ship-launched torpedo tubes, and the helicopter’s two 
torpedoes. In an ASUW role against PGFGs, the striking 
power is eight Swedish RBS SSMs and, against the small 
boats, it is four Hellfires. Defensive power is two against 
the SSM firing enemy from the same gun as the LCS, a rapid 
firing 57 mm gun. Staying power against lightweight 
torpedoes and long-range SSMs is one and short range SSMs 
is 1.5. 
B. OPPOSING FORCE MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
As mentioned, OPFOR is expected in the form of two TFs 
approaching as waves of attackers. In TF 480, there are 
three classes of PTGs for a total of ten ships forming TG 
480.04. Since this TG is attacking as a group, for modeling 
purposes, they are homogenized as one type of PTG. This 
homogenization process only affects the striking power of 
the TG. The rest of the features of each class are almost 
identical and assumed to be the same. Striking power 
decision calculations are detailed in Appendix C. Similarly 
in TG 480.05, there are three classes of PTFs for a total 
of 11 ships. They are also very similar in design and, 
since each carry two lightweight torpedoes, no 
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homogenization is needed and they are assumed to be the 
same type of PTF. The major threat comes from TF 480 in the 
heart of the Strait. This is due to the submarines involved 
and the large number of other vessels.  
TF 490 operations in the western part of the Strait 
are bound to two bases and more limited. Although TF 490 is 
assumed to attack in three TGs, as previously discussed, it 
is modeled to attack in two waves. In the first wave, PGFGs 
and PTGs attack in a combined TG, a combination of four 
Thondor class PGFG of TG 490.01 and a total of eight PTGs 
from TG 490.02. The purpose is to swarm the FRIFOR ships, 
saturating their defense and creating an opening to attack 
the tankers or other merchant vessels being screened. In 
this case, the FRIFOR attacks with all the helicopters and 
ship-born missiles combined regardless of PGFGs stand-off 
distance and unreasonable expenditure of long range SSMs on 
small boats. Similar to TG 480.04, TG 490.02 is also 
homogenized to create the same class of PTGs out of two 
different classes. Since this combined wave includes PGFGs 
and PTGs, their striking power (C-802s and C-701s), 
defensive power (large caliber guns on Thondor classes), 
and staying powers are homogenized. Detailed calculations 
are shown in Appendix C. The second wave of TF 490 is TG 
490.03, composed of four classes of PTF for a total of six 
boats, and since they all carry two torpedoes, no 
homogenization process is needed.  
The operational number of total force strength from 
each base is modified to take into account the maintenance 
cycle or Operational Defect (OPDEF) of the ships. A 1:5 
ratio of unavailable ships is considered and validated by 
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CAPT Hughes for the Iranian Navy. This depicts that one out 
of five operational ships of each class is unavailable and 
in port due to the maintenance cycle or OPDEF. The 
following information describes the assumptions and 
limitations of each attacker wave within TFs. The details 
of model input parameters for every encounter and the rest 
of the Salvo Model parameters for the OPFOR candidates are 
discussed in the next section. 
1. TG 480.01: Kilo Class SSK 
Both Kilo classes that are allocated to operate from 
Bandar Abbas are involved in the initial wave. The 
submarine has six torpedo-launching tubes and is given a 
striking power of six. Defensive and staying power are both 
one. As mentioned, surface ship versus submarine engagement 
has not been modeled with Salvo Equations before. Thus, 
this encounter is expected to give new insights regarding 
the use of Salvo Equations in ASW. Results displayed in the 
next chapter show it seems necessary that the submarine 
threat be eliminated by conventional ASW forces before 
littoral operations begin. Salvo Equations vividly show the 
dominance of the submarines in ship versus submarine 
encounters. It shows that a very small number of submarines 
can pose a serious threat and a large number of ships are 
required to dominate the encounter. 
2. TG 480.02: Kaman Class PGFG 
Also operating from Bandar Abbas, five of the six 
ships are available. Since they have the long-range SSMs, 
they are expected to be the second encounter. Striking 
power is designated as four C-802 long-range SSMs. From the 
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76 mm gun, defensive power is only two. Staying power is 
one against long range SSMs and 1.5 against Hellfires. 
3. TG 480.03: Yono Class SSC 
These midget submarines are also expected out of 
Bandar Abbas and all three are available. After the initial 
two waves of attackers as FRIFOR ships move towards the 
Iranian mainland, Yono classes are expected to pose the 
third threat. Assumed to be carrying two torpedoes, the 
striking power is two. Defensive power and staying power is 
the same as Kilo, one. 
4. TG 480.04: PTGs 
As the fourth wave of attackers, a total of ten PTGs 
of three classes from three bases make up this TG, however 
only eight are available. Their combined striking power is 
2.8 C-701s. Defensive and staying power is one. 
5. TG 480.05: PTFs 
Similarly, a total of 11 PTFs of three classes from 
two bases make up this TG, however only nine are available. 
All ships have two torpedoes and given a striking power of 
two. Defensive and staying power are one. 
6. TG 490.01-02: Thondor Class PGFGs and PTGs 
The first wave of attack in the western region is the 
combination of three available Thondor class ships out of 
four from Bandar Lengeh, and seven available PTGs out of 
eight from the two western bases. Combined striking power 
of the two classes of PTGs is 2.9 C-701s and striking power 
of Thondor is four C-802s. Therefore, total homogenized 
striking power becomes 3.2. Defensive power of PTGs is one 
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and due to rapid firing medium caliber guns, Thondor’s 
defensive power is two. Their homogenized defensive power 
is 1.3. Staying power of this TG is 1.2 against Hellfires 
and varies between one and 1.2 for the combination of 
attacking missiles. This is due to Hellfire and SSMs, since 
not each FRIFOR ship has the same number of SSMs on board 
or Hellfires on the helicopters. 
7. TG 490.03: PTFs 
Similar to TG 480.05, a total of six PTFs of four 
classes from two bases make up this TG; however only five 
are available. All ships have two torpedoes making a 
striking power of two. Defensive and staying power are one. 
C. MODEL INPUT PARAMETERS 
In this section, model input parameters for every 
encounter are displayed based on the specifications of the 
vessels detailed in Appendices A and B. Assumptions are 
made with the approval of CAPT Hughes. For each encounter, 
targeting/scouting effectiveness, defender readiness/ 
alertness and training effectiveness are also shown. For 
base case model runs, seduction and distraction 
countermeasure effectiveness are not taken into 
consideration yet; rather, these two parameters are assumed 
to be one, making no effect on the equations. To determine 
the number of ships required for Breakpoint and Dominance 
over OPFOR, the number of FRIFOR units is made a variable. 
OPFOR numbers are fixed and represent the operational 
numbers available not in maintenance cycle.  
Striking power is the number of weapons available. The 
number of well-aimed weapons that goes into the equations 
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is calculated by striking power multiplied by the WLR, 
which is 0.9 for all FRIFOR and OPFOR, and the WHP, which 
is different for all weapon types as explained in Chapter 
II. Leakage rates that directly affect the results in the 
number of remaining units are also explained in Chapter II. 
Defensive and staying power calculations of FRIFOR are 
explained in Appendix C. OPFOR training effectiveness is 
always 0.95; whereas, FRIFOR’s, due to superior training by 
assumption, is one. Defensive readiness of OPFOR is always 
one due to regional expertise and the surprise effect on 
their behalf. The accumulated results of every encounter 
are displayed in the next section. The following tables 
show the model input parameters of six candidate designs 
versus seven waves of attackers in two TFs, resulting in a 
total of 42 different engagements. The first five 
encounters represent the battle against TF 490 in the 
center of the Strait of Hormuz. The remaining two are 
against TF 480 in the western entrance to the Strait. 
1. FRIFOR vs. 2 x Kilo SSK (TG 480.01) 
Both sides are firing torpedoes at each other, which 
results in a staying power of one for all ships. The Kilo 
has six torpedo tubes. The ships attack combined with their 
single helicopters or, in Freedom’s case, with two ASW 
helicopters. Defensive power of surface ships is two due to 
greater defensive maneuverability. Kilo has no defensive 
weapons and her targeting effectiveness is one due to her 
Situational Awareness (SA) superiority. Due to having two 
helicopters, Freedom has better targeting effectiveness and 





Freedom Formid. MILGEM Stere. Sigma Visby Kilo 
Number of Units Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. 2 
Striking/Offensive 
Power 
8  10 8 12 8 6 6 
Defensive Power 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Staying Power 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Targeting/Scouting 
Effectiveness 
0.9 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 1 
Defensive 
Readiness/Alertness 
0.9 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 1 
Training 
Effectiveness 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.95
WHP 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Leakage Rate 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Table 9.   FRIFOR vs. 2 x Kilo Model Parameters. 
2. FRIFOR vs. 5 x Kaman PGFG (TG 480.02) 
Five Kamans are operational out of the available six 
and each has four C-802 SSMs for a striking power of four. 
76 mm main gun and other guns result in a defensive power 
of two. Staying power is one against long-range SSMs and 
1.5 against Hellfires. All FRIFOR ships except for Freedom 
and Steregushchiy attack with SSMs only. No helicopters are 
used due to Kaman’s gun standoff distance. Freedom and 
Steregushchiy, however, lack SSMs and they, therefore, must 
rely on ASUW helicopters. Freedom uses only one helicopter 
due to the threat mentioned above. Helicopters not used for 
attack are tasked for ISR. Defensive power against enemy 
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missiles and staying power are calculated as detailed in 
Appendix C. Regional expertise and surprise effects create 
a good targeting effectiveness for Kaman, but not as well 
as Freedom. This is because Freedom uses UAVs for 
targeting, which provide Freedom a better defensive 
readiness. Steregushchiy relies on her helicopter for 
attack and does not have an additional helicopter for ISR. 
Therefore, she has lower values for targeting effectiveness 




Freedom Formid. MILGEM Stere. Sigma Visby Kaman 
Number of Units Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. 5 
Striking/Offensive 
Power 
8  8 8 8 4 8 4 
Defensive Power 9 9 8 7.7 3 2 2 
Staying Power 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.4 1 1/1.5
Targeting/Scouting 
Effectiveness 
1 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Defensive 
Readiness/Alertness 
1 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.95 1 
Training 
Effectiveness 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.95 
WHP 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Leakage Rate 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Table 10.   FRIFOR vs. 5 x Kaman Model Parameters. 
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3. FRIFOR vs. 3 x Yono SSC (TG 480.03) 
This encounter is the same as the Kilo encounter 
except for the number of Yono class boats and torpedo 
tubes, which is two. The targeting effectiveness of Yono is 
slightly less than Kilo due to technical differences. 





Freedom Formid. MILGEM Stere. Sigma Visby Yono 
Number of Units Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. 3 
Striking/Offensive 
Power 
8  10 8 12 8 6 2 
Defensive Power 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Staying Power 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Targeting/Scouting 
Effectiveness 
0.9 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.95
Defensive 
Readiness/Alertness 
0.9 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 1 
Training 
Effectiveness 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.95
WHP 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Leakage Rate 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Table 11.   FRIFOR vs. 3 x Yono Model Parameters. 
4. FRIFOR vs. 8 x PTGs (TG 480.04) 
Out of ten PTGs in three classes available in this TG, 
eight are operational. They have a homogenized striking 
power of 2.8, as derived in Appendix C. TG 480.04 has two 
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Mk 13 with four C-701s, one C-14 with four C-701s and five 
Peykaap II with two C-701s. Due to OPDEF, one C-14 and one 
Peykaap II are disregarded. Since they have no defensive 
weapons, their defensive power is considered one. 
Similarly, staying power is one due to their very small 
size. Their targeting effectiveness is less than PGFGs due 
to inferior technology. Defensive readiness, however, is 
one due to their regional expertise and smaller RCS. As 
mentioned before, FRIFOR is to engage PTGs with 
helicopters. This is only because Hellfires are more 
suitable than larger SSMs and there is no threat to 
helicopters. Freedom will attack with both helicopters, 
giving her better striking power, targeting effectiveness, 
and defensive readiness than the other FRIFOR candidates. 
Sigma and Visby have lighter Seahawk-like helicopters with 
only four Hellfires as opposed to eight. Since all OPFOR 
are firing smaller C-701s, the staying power of FRIFOR is 
greater then in the engagement against PGFGs. Generally, 
FRIFOR attributes are degraded against PTGs, relative to 
PGFGs, due to the former’s smaller RCS and regional 












Freedom Formid. MILGEM Stere. Sigma Visby PTG 
Number of Units Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. 8 
Striking/Offensive 
Power 
16 8 8 8 4 4 2.8 
Defensive Power 9 9 8 7.7 3 2 1 
Staying Power 2.9 2.9 2.3 2.5 2.1 1.5 1 
Targeting/Scouting 
Effectiveness 
0.95 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Defensive 
Readiness/Alertness 
0.95 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 
Training 
Effectiveness 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.95 
WHP 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Leakage Rate 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Table 12.   FRIFOR vs. 8 x PTG Model Parameters.  
5. FRIFOR vs. 9 x PTFs (TG 480.05) 
Eleven PTFs in three classes are available in the 
center of the Strait, but only nine are operational with a 
striking power of two torpedoes. There are three Tir with 
two heavyweight torpedoes, four Peykaap I and two Kajami 
semi-submersible boats with two lightweight torpedoes each. 
One Tir and one Peykaap I are eliminated due to OPDEF. 
Tir’s heavyweight torpedoes are assumed to be the same as 
the lightweight torpedoes. Other than the number of units 
and striking power, the rest of the attributes are the same 
as for PTGs, except for WHP and Leakage Rates. This is due 
to different offensive weapons. FRIFOR’s offensive, 
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defensive and other attributes are very similar to the 
previous encounter against PTGs. The main difference is 
that the staying power is less. This is due to FRIFOR being 
attacked by torpedoes. Defensive power is three for all 
FRIFOR ships. Due to an early detection possibility, this 
is better than against submarines. Defensive readiness of 
the higher speed ships, Freedom and Visby, is better than 




Freedom Formid. MILGEM Stere. Sigma Visby PTF 
Number of Units Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. 9 
Striking/Offensive 
Power 
16 8 8 8 4 4 2 
Defensive Power 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 
Staying Power 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.4 1 1 
Targeting/Scouting 
Effectiveness 
0.95 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Defensive 
Readiness/Alertness 
1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.95 1 
Training 
Effectiveness 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.95 
WHP 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Leakage Rate 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.15 
Table 13.   FRIFOR vs. 9 x PTF Model Parameters. 
6. FRIFOR vs. 10 x PGFG-PTGs (TG 490.01-02) 
This encounter is envisioned to demonstrate a 
desperation attack by the Iranian naval forces. All 
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missile-firing ships of the Iranian naval forces from the 
western part of the Strait are combined to create a 
missile-swarm against FRIFOR. In this case, FRIFOR is to 
attack back with missiles on ships and helicopters 
combined. This is regardless of consideration of weapon and 
target proportionality and PGFG gun standoff distance. 
Three operational Thondor-class PGFGs out of four ships and 
seven operational PTGs out of eight form this combined 
OPFOR TG. One Thondor and one Peykaap II are eliminated due 
to OPDEF.  
The combined homogenized striking power of C-802 
firing PGFGs and C-701 firing PTGs is 3.2, as explained in 
Appendix C. These missiles are considered the same for the 
calculations. Their effect, however, for FRIFOR is factored 
in as described below. Homogenized WHP and Leakage Rate 
values for these two types of missiles combined are 0.76 
and 0.08 respectively. The defensive power of Thondor is 
two, due to one 30 mm gun, and for PTG it is one. When 
homogenized the defensive power becomes 1.3. The staying 
power of Thondor and PTG is one for all SSMs, but 1.5 and 1 
against Hellfires, respectively. When combined, the 
homogenized value becomes 1.2 if attacked by helicopters 
only and 1.1 if attacked by ships and helicopters combined. 
Both defensive and staying power calculations can also be 
found in Appendix C. Freedom attacks with two ASUW 
helicopters; Steregushchiy attacks with one ASUW 
helicopter; the rest of the candidates attack with ship and 
helicopter combined. The staying power of FRIFOR is 
calculated with the effect of an incoming mixture of enemy 
missiles. Targeting effectiveness and defensive readiness 
differ against PGFG and PTG combined. The value, however, 
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is homogenized. As with OPFOR, when FRIFOR attacks with 
ship and helicopter combined, WHP and Leakage Rate change 




Freedom Formid. MILGEM Stere. Sigma Visby PGFG-PTG 
Number of Units Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. 10 
Striking/Offensive 
Power 
16 16 16 8 8 12 3.2 
Defensive Power 9 9 8 7.7 3 2 1.3 
Staying Power 2.5 2.5 2 2.2 1.8 1.3 1.1/1.2
Targeting/Scouting 
Effectiveness 
0.97 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.95 
Defensive 
Readiness/Alertness 
0.97 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 1 
Training 
Effectiveness 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.95 
WHP 0.8 0.75 0.75 0.8 0.75 0.73 0.76 
Leakage Rate 0.1 0.08 0.08 0.1 0.08 0.07 0.08 
Table 14.   FRIFOR vs. 10 x Thondor-PTG Model Parameters.  
7. FRIFOR vs. 5 x PTFs (TG 490.03) 
Six PTFs in four classes are available, but five are 
operational in this TG. There are two Tir and one of each 
from the Peykaap I, Kajami and Gahjae classes. One Peykaap 
I is disregarded due to OPDEF. Other than the number of 
units, all attribute values/assumptions of FRIFOR and OPFOR 
are the same as the fifth encounter against the nine PTFs 
of TG 480.05. 
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D. BASE CASE MODEL RUN RESULTS 
As specified in Chapter II, the two MOE are the FER 
and the number of remaining units on both sides. After the 
model parameters described in the previous section are 
inputted in an Excel-based Salvo Equations Model, the 
number of units out of action for both sides (also the 
number of remaining units) and the FER are obtained for 
each of the 42 encounters. For this purpose, 42 Excel pages 
are created to eliminate any error in the modeling 
sequence. Hence, every encounter has at least one different 
attribute value. In the base case, the number of OPFOR 
units is fixed and the number of FRIFOR units is varied. 
The purpose is to determine the required number of ships 
for Breakpoint and Dominance of FRIFOR over OPFOR. This is 
determined by graphing the FER and the number of remaining 
units for both sides as the Y-Axis over the number of 
FRIFOR units as the X-Axis.  
Recall that Breakpoint is achieved when the number of 
remaining FRIFOR units is strictly greater than the number 
of remaining OPFOR units. When the FER is greater than one, 
FRIFOR reduces OPFOR by a greater fraction. This results in 
FRIFOR’s win over OPFOR. A FER of one is defined as parity 
when each force causes attrition of the other at equal 
rates. The number of ships required for Breakpoint is 
chosen from the integer values of the number of FRIFOR 
units on the X-Axis. In some cases, parity might continue 
for a few integer numbers of ships, but as the number of 
FRIFOR units is increased, at some point the number of 
remaining FRIFOR units exceeds the remaining OPFOR units.  
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This integer value of the number of FRIFOR units is 
accepted as the number of ships required for the Breakpoint 
with OPFOR.  
Dominance is chosen similarly to Breakpoint. In this 
case, the number of remaining OPFOR ships has to be zero. 
The number of remaining FRIFOR units has to be maximized or 
the number of losses minimized (the number of losses can 
never be zero due to leakers). After that point, the FER 
has to have a linear increase. This means the minimum 
FRIFOR loss is achieved and is constant after that point. 
As the number of FRIFOR units increase, the FER increases 
as well. Initially, the increase is exponential, but it 
then r linear as the number of remaining OPFOR units 
becomes zero and FRIFOR loss reaches the minimum. At this 
point, when the FER curve becomes linear, the integer value 
of the number of FRIFOR units is the number of ships 
required for Dominance over OPFOR. This equates to OPFOR 
annihilation.  
Figure 3 is a visual example of the result of a sample 
encounter amongst the 42 separate runs. The graph is 
associated with the Visby versus 10 Thondor-PTG encounter, 
where Visby and FRIFOR is represented as Force A and OPFOR 
is represented as Force B. As seen from the graph, if there 
is one or two Visbys, the result is total FRIFOR 
annihilation. If there are 3-6 Visby, then parity is 
achieved with a FER of one, where both forces attrite each 
other until no ship survives. With seven Visby presents, 
the remaining number of FRIFOR units is greater than 
remaining OPFOR units and the FER is strictly greater than 
one, which is Breakpoint. Then, as the number of Visbys 
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increase, the remaining number of FRIFOR units gets larger 
and the FER increases dramatically. Meanwhile, the number 
of remaining OPFOR units is zero. Dominance, however, is 
not achieved until out-of-action FRIFOR units are 
minimized. The number of losses cannot be better than 1.35 
in this case, due to the leakage rate, and the FER curve 
becomes linearly increasing after this point. This happens 
when there are 11 Visbys, which is the number of ships 
required for Dominance. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Visby vs. 10 x Thondor-PTG. 
Another example is displayed in Figure 4, Freedom 
versus 5 x Kaman encounter. Force A is FRIFOR or Freedom. 
In this case, when two Freedoms are present the FRIFOR loss 
is minimized; the FER is greater than one. However, the 
number of remaining OPFOR is still greater than the number 
of remaining Freedoms. When the number of Freedoms is 
increased to three, it is seen that remaining number of 
Freedoms is maximized and greater than remaining OPFOR, 
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which is essentially zero. The FER is already greater than 
one and is linearly increasing. As a result, at this point, 




Figure 4.   Freedom vs. 5 x Kaman. 
Base case runs are conducted with zero countermeasure 
effectiveness. For each of 42 encounters, the associated 
FER and remaining units have been graphed. These graphs 
reveal insightful results for some encounters that have not 
been modeled using Salvo Equations before, such as surface 
ship versus submarine encounters. Some results were not 
predicted and directed further inquiry as shown in the 
Sensitivity Analysis section. From the 42 encounter 
results, required numbers for Breakpoint and Dominance are 
shown in Table 15 for each FRIFOR candidate against each of 
seven attackers in two different parts of the Strait of 
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Hormuz, using the FER and the number of remaining ships 
from both sides within two decimal places. 
FRIFOR 
Freedom Formid. MILGEM Stere. Sigma Visby OPFOR 
Br. Do. Br. Do. Br. Do. Br. Do. Br. Do. Br. Do.
TF 480  
2 x Kilo 4 6 4 6 4 6 4 6 4 6 4 6 
5 x Kaman 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 6 5 6 
3 x Yono 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 
8 x PTG 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 6 6 8 
9 x PTF 3 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 6 6 6 
TF 490  
10 x Thondor-PTG 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 8 7 11 
5 x PTF 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 
Table 15.   Base Case Breakpoint and Dominance Requirements. 
The results show the required number of FRIFOR ships 
for Breakpoint and Dominance at each encounter. The 
question of the total number of FRIFOR ships required in 
the Strait of Hormuz against OPFOR remains. The Breakpoint 
results represent the number of ships needed to do just 
better than parity. In that case, the OPFOR might have been 
annihilated or the number of remaining FRIFOR units might 
be almost zero depending on the circumstances and the 
attributes. Therefore, the total number of ships required 
for Breakpoint cannot be calculated. Breakpoint results are 
shown to give decision makers an insight of the minimum 
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required force in different encounters and circumstances to 
neutralize the enemy just over parity, but not necessarily 
to annihilate or dominate. If resources are available the 
Dominance number gives the best case for any encounter. In 
a dominant situation, FRIFOR wins, with minimum acceptable 
losses, and OPFOR is annihilated.  
In this thesis, the total number of ships required for 
Dominance is calculated based on the following assumptions. 
The first five encounters in Table 15 happen against TF 480 
in the center of the Strait. These five waves of attackers 
are assumed to be encountered in the order of the table’s 
column. Although dominance is the annihilation of the enemy 
in an encounter, due to leakers after each encounter, about 
one FRIFOR ship is taken out of action regardless of the 
real number (this number could be less than or above one, 
depending on the encounter, but in general it is about 
one). For instance, in the case of Freedom, to dominate TF 
480’s five waves of attackers, nine ships are required to 
dominate the threat. If nine ships are initially present in 
the center of the Strait to battle against TF 480, eight 
remain after dominating the first wave of Kilos. Normally 
six ships are enough, but more are required for later waves 
of attackers. Further, due to leakers, one becomes 
unavailable so that eight remains for the next encounter. 
As FRIFOR progresses, if the encounters continue with this 
logic (enough numbers to dominate each encounter and, after 
every encounter, only losing one), at the last encounter 
there will be five ships left to ensure dominance over the 
nine PTFs.  
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Domination calculations give the worst case scenario 
for FRIFOR losses and give a high number of required ships 
for the mission to annihilate OPFOR. Similarly, TF 490, 
having two waves of attackers, can be dominated by four 
Freedoms in the western entrance to the Strait. Thus, the 
total number of Freedoms required to dominate Iranian Naval 
Forces in the Strait of Hormuz becomes 13 Freedoms. The 




Freedom Formidable MILGEM Steregushchiy Sigma Visby
TF 480 9 9 9 9 10 11 
TF 490 4 4 4 5 8 11 
TOTAL 13 13 13 14 18 22 
Table 16.   Base Case Total Number of Ships Required for 
Dominance.  
Based on these total ship requirements for Dominance 
over OPFOR, associated ranking of the FRIFOR candidate 
ships is as follows, which is discussed in the last chapter 
after countermeasure effectiveness have been introduced. 
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Ranking Class Number of Required Ships 
1 Freedom 13 
2 Formidable 13 
3 MILGEM 13 
4 Steregushchiy 14 
5 Sigma 18 
6 Visby 22 
Table 17.   Base Case FRIFOR Candidate Ship Ranking.  
E. HARDKILL CAPABILITY BOOST TO SIGMA AND VISBY 
There is a significant difference between the smaller 
candidates, Sigma and Visby, and the rest of the candidate 
designs. There are a number of reasons for this. Since 
these ships are smaller, they do not have a hangar; 
therefore, they have limited helicopter capability. The 
lighter version of Seahawk is carried on these ships, which 
has fewer weapons. Less weapons means less striking power, 
but there are other factors. Due to smaller length and 
weight, their staying power is also smaller, especially 
that of the Visby. For Sigma and Visby in the equations, 
staying power has a greater impact than striking power. The 
main problem, however, is that the defensive power of Sigma 
and Visby is significantly lower than the alternatives. 
This creates the need for more ships for Dominance.  
Due to their poorer defenses, in some cases Sigma and 
Visby are only slightly better than the OPFOR. Even though 
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breakpoint numbers are close to the other candidates, Visby 
and Sigma require more ships to dominate their opponents. 
In these encounters, defensive power is more important than 
striking power. Since the enemy has very little defensive 
capability, if FRIFOR can deny their shots, even FRIFOR’s 
little striking power will do much damage. Sigma has the 8-
cell Mistral IR missile launcher as a defensive SAM, which 
is not a sophisticated defense, and a 76 mm gun. This gives 
her a defensive power of three. Visby, however, has no SAM 
and only a capable 57 mm gun. This results in a defensive 
power of only two.  
To bring these two ships to a similar level of 
performance as the bigger candidates and to reduce the 
greater requirement for Dominance, it is envisioned that if 
a 21 cell RAM launcher is added to Sigma and Visby as a 
hardkill boost, impressive results could be achieved. RAM 
launcher is chosen since it is a typical defensive PDMS 
used against SSMs. Many modern navies choose it for their 
smaller combatants’ sole defense. Also, it is a lighter and 
cheaper system than many SAM launchers, such as Sea 
Sparrow, and, since it is IR guided, requires less 
manpower. For modeling purposes, the size, manpower, cost, 
and RCS of these vessels would not change with the addition 
of RAM. This is because these changes could be assumed 
insignificant.  
To demonstrate the effects when Sigma has a RAM in 
place of her Mistral launcher and Visby has a RAM launcher 
installed onto an appropriate place on the open deck, their 
defensive powers were changed to eight and nine, 
respectively, lifting their defensive power relative to the 
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other candidates. Hardkill added to Sigma and Visby can 
only affect the encounters against missile firing OPFOR 
units, PGFGs and PTGs. Table 18 shows the results after the 












Br. Do. Br. Do. Br. Do. Br. Do. 
TF 480  
5 x Kaman 5 6 5 6 5 6 3 3 
8 x PTG 5 6 5 6 6 8 5 6 
TF 490  
10 x Thondor-PTG 5 8 4 5 7 11 3 3 
Table 18.   Breakpoint and Dominance Requirements after 
Hardkill Boost to Sigma and Visby.  
 The effects of hardkill and the results are addressed 
more in the Sensitivity Analysis section. After the 
hardkill boost, the changes in the total required number of 












TF 480 10 10 11 10 
TF 490 8 5 11 5 
TOTAL 18 15 22 15 
Table 19.   Total Number of Ships Required for Dominance 
after Hardkill Boost to Sigma and Visby.  
With hardkill boost to Sigma and Visby, the 
alternatives’ requirements of Dominance are shown in Table 
20. The required number of ships for Sigma and Visby 
without the hardkill boost is written in parenthesis. 
 
Ranking Class Number of Required Ships 
1 Freedom 13 
2 Formidable 13 
3 MILGEM 13 
4 Steregushchiy 14 
5 Visby 15 (22) 
6 Sigma 15 (18) 
Table 20.   FRIFOR Candidate Ship Ranking after Hardkill 
Boost to Sigma and Visby.  
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F. INTRODUCTION OF COUNTERMEASURE EFFECTIVENESS FOR REAL-
TIME APPROXIMATION 
In this section, the information provided in the 
previous section is disregarded and no hardkill improvement 
has been made to Sigma and Visby. The section continues on 
from the base case. 
Analytical modeling of a real world naval warfare 
scenario cannot be complete without accounting for 
countermeasure effectiveness. Measuring countermeasure 
effectiveness can be challenging with much to be discovered 
about this phenomenon and its application to naval warfare. 
The effects of countermeasures in warfare modeling are made 
difficult by secrecy. A few experts succeeded in providing 
healthy insights, although many countries (especially the 
developers) are reluctant to disclose any information about 
their Electronic Support or Countermeasure capabilities 
(Kline, 2008). Capturing the effects of Electronic Warfare 
remains as one of the few warfare areas not fully explored. 
Unclassified modeling of such warfare is difficult and 
could be manipulative for intelligence reasons. Basic Salvo 
Equations do not account directly for countermeasure 
effectiveness. This study, however, uses the Embellished 
Salvo Equations solely to model the scenario as 
realistically as possible.  
In Chapter II, seduction and distraction 
countermeasure effectiveness has been addressed in detail. 
Base case model runs do not include countermeasure 
effectiveness. In this section, the details and effects of 
countermeasure effectiveness are introduced and 
investigated separately. Modeling countermeasure 
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effectiveness with the Salvo Equations is complicated. 
Information on ship design’s stealthy features, low 
signatures, Electronic Support Measure (ESM) and Electronic 
Countermeasure (ECM) equipments, chaffs, decoys, etc. is 
not easily obtained. Only basic information is available 
and the rest is classified. This makes it quite judgmental 
to assign a value to countermeasure attributes in the 
Embellished Salvo Equations. 
Since assigning mere guessed values to these two 
attributes is difficult to defend, the method used in this 
study is to detect the acceptable level of countermeasure 
effectiveness for each FRIFOR candidate. For each of the 42 
encounters, another set of graphs, similar to previous 
ones, has been generated. While the Y-axis continues to 
show the number of remaining units and the FER, the X-axis 
now shows Countermeasure Effectiveness. To make the 
modeling easier, seduction and distraction values are 
inputted as equal values.  
In the Salvo Equations, seduction countermeasure has a 
direct effect on the combat power of the opponent; 
distraction countermeasure has a direct effect on the 
fighting power of the opponent, which is a sub-part of 
combat power. Thus, both countermeasure values affect the 
enemy and, if kept at one, they have no effect. To 
reiterate the example in their definition, if seduction or 
distraction countermeasure is 0.85, 15% of enemy’s missiles 
are seduced or distracted, respectively. In this section, 
seduction and distraction both take an equal value, forming 
the X-axis as Countermeasure Effectiveness between 0% and 
50%. The number of OPFOR is fixed as before. To visually 
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investigate the graphs and detect the number of required 
ships for Breakpoint and Dominance, this time the number of 
FRIFOR ships is inputted manually. 
Amongst the Iranian Naval Forces, the only vessels 
that could have countermeasure features are the Kilo class 
submarines and Kaman class PGFGs. The rest of the ships 
either have no significant features or there is no 
information about them. Kilo has torpedo countermeasures 
and Kaman has ESM/ECM equipment. They are not, however, 
competitive enough for FRIFOR. If included in the Salvo 
Equations, Iranian countermeasure effectiveness values 
would make insignificant improvements. Therefore, Iranian 
assets’ countermeasure effectiveness is assumed one and has 
zero effect in the equations.  
The acceptable level of countermeasures for each class 
is an assumption, basically a determined threshold, which 
is explained here. FRIFOR ships, except for Visby, can have 
the following maximum countermeasure effectiveness limits: 
20% against submarines; 30% against PTFs; and 35% against 
PGFGs and PTGs. Counter-targeting against submarines is 
extremely hard. This is due to their covertness and is yet 
to be perfected. Therefore, this threat is the hardest to 
tackle. Although PTFs are surface vessels, if fired before 
distracted, a torpedo (as opposed to a missile) is harder 
to seduce, making PTFs the second deadliest threat in this 
scenario as seen in the base case results. Freedom’s 
countermeasure effectiveness is assumed equivalent to the 
remaining four designs.  
Visby, on the other hand, has significantly better 
design features. Many experts recognize it as one of the 
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few fully stealth and low-signature ships operational 
around the world. Since Visby is significantly smaller than 
the other candidates and to make the study more useful, it 
is conjectured that Visby has 10% more countermeasure 
effectiveness against OPFOR: 30% against submarines; 40% 
against PTFs; and 45% against PGFGs and PTGs.  
Figures 5 and 6 visually display the effect of 
countermeasure on designs. A continuation of Figure 3, 
Visby versus 10 Thondor-PTG, Figure 5 shows the breakpoint 
requirement and Figure 6 shows the Dominance requirement. 
Force A is FRIFOR, Visby, and Force B is OPFOR, a 
combination of Thondor-PTG TG in TF 490. In Figure 5, the 
number of Visbys for this case is four. The X-axis is the 
countermeasure effectiveness, where value 0.0 represents 0% 
or no effect on countermeasure and 0.5 represents 50% 
effectiveness. This means that 50% of incoming successful 
enemy weapons are seduced or distracted. It is seen that at 
point 0.375 on X-axis, the FER goes over one and the number 
of remaining FRIFOR units becomes greater than remaining 
OPFOR. This point means that if the number of FRIFOR units 
is four, 38% countermeasure effectiveness, which is within 
the limit of 45% against PGFGs and PTGs, is enough to have 
a Breakpoint with OPFOR. More specifically, starting from 
one available FRIFOR ship, the number has been increased 
and its associated graph has been investigated. At four 
ships, it is seen that Breakpoint conditions are met at the 
38% mark within the 45% countermeasure effectiveness limit. 
Thus, when countermeasure effectiveness is introduced to 
the equations, the number of required Visbys to have a 




Figure 5.   Visby vs. 10 x Thondor-PTG with Countermeasure 
Effectiveness, Breakpoint. 
Figure 6 is the Dominance example of the same 
encounter. In this case, the number of available FRIFOR 
ships has been increased until Dominance conditions are met 
within the 45% limit. At seven Visbys present, it is seen 
that as the countermeasure effectiveness is increased, the 
number of remaining FRIFOR ships increase and reach the 
maximum, or the level of minimum losses due to leakers, at 
point 0.35, which is 35% effectiveness. From here on, 
Dominance conditions are met and seven Visbys is a big 
improvement from the previous result of 11. The important 
difference in this graph from the previous Dominance graph 
is that since X-axis is not the number of ships, but 
countermeasure effectiveness, after the Dominance point is 
reached, FER becomes a fixed number. After a certain level 
of effectiveness is provided, adding more does not change 
the result, since the enemy is already annihilated.  
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Figure 6.   Visby vs. 10 x Thondor-PTG with Countermeasure 
Effectiveness, Dominance. 
As a result, the 42 encounters have been reexamined 
with the addition of countermeasure effectiveness to 
FRIFOR. The number of available FRIFOR ships for each 
encounter is varied. Breakpoint and Dominance conditions, 
given the maximum countermeasure effectiveness limit for 
each candidate and encounter, are determined. The number of 
FRIFOR ships required for Breakpoint and Dominance is 




Freedom Formid. MILGEM Stere. Sigma Visby OPFOR 
Br. Do. Br. Do. Br. Do. Br. Do. Br. Do. Br. Do.
TF 480  
2 x Kilo 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 3 4 
5 x Kaman 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 6 3 4 
3 x Yono 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 
8 x PTG 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 6 5 6 
9 x PTF 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 5 6 6 6 
TF 490  
10 x Thondor-PTG 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 5 4 5 4 6 
5 x PTF 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 3 4 
Table 21.   Breakpoint and Dominance Requirements with 
Countermeasure Effectiveness Approximation.   
After including the countermeasure effectiveness, 





Freedom Formidable MILGEM Steregushchiy Sigma Visby
TF 480 7 8 8 8 10 10 
TF 490 3 3 3 5 5 6 
TOTAL 10 11 11 13 15 16 
Table 22.   Total Number of Ships Required for Dominance with 
Countermeasure Effectiveness Approximation.  
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Without regard for cost, the final ranking of the 
FRIFOR candidates with countermeasure effectiveness as a 
real-time approximation is displayed in Table 23. The 
results for the base case, without the acknowledgement of 
countermeasure effectiveness, are written in parenthesis. 
 
Ranking Class Number of Required Ships 
1 Freedom 10 (13) 
2 Formidable 11 (13) 
3 MILGEM 11 (13) 
4 Steregushchiy 13 (14) 
5 Sigma 15 (18) 
6 Visby 16 (22) 
Table 23.   FRIFOR Candidate Ship Ranking after 
Countermeasure Effectiveness Approximation.  
G. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Since the candidates are closely grouped together, it 
is important to note that Sensitivity Analysis is only as 
good as the input values. Regardless, Sensitivity Analysis 
is designed to enhance the understanding of the model’s 
results. This section addresses the insights about the 
results of the encounters and how they compare amongst the 
FRIFOR candidates. The effects of hardkill boost on the 
initial base case results are also discussed. Not all 
encounters, however, are analyzed. Only the encounters 
where there is a significant difference amongst the 
candidates are analyzed.  
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1. FRIFOR vs. Submarine Encounters 
In the base case, all submarine (Kilo and Yono) 
encounters by the FRIFOR candidates yield the same results. 
Against Kilo, four and six ships are required for 
Breakpoint and Dominance, respectively. The results are two 
and three for the Yono threat. Against Kilo, the reason for 
these results is that FRIFOR ships have the same defensive 
and staying power. The major contributor in this encounter 
is the defensive power. All FRIFOR ships have a defensive 
power of two. This is due to their lack of anti-torpedo 
weapons; therefore, they all perform poorly. Increasing 
this value has a major effect on the FER. For example, if 
it is four, then only three ships are required for 
Dominance against Kilo as opposed to the initial six.  
Staying power has an effect as well, but not nearly as 
much as the defensive power. FRIFOR ships’ different 
striking powers have no effect. This is because the 
defensive power is so low. Since it contributes to striking 
power, it is also found that targeting effectiveness has no 
effect as well. Defensive readiness, however, has some 
effect due to its contribution to defensive power. 
Freedom’s defensive readiness is slightly better than 
others, but not enough to make a change on the integer 
results. Thus, Freedom performs slightly better than the 
others, while the others have the same performance 
regardless of their different striking powers. In the Yono 
engagement, since Yono’s striking power is only two, the 
striking powers of FRIFOR ships do make some differences, 
but not enough to change the integer results. In 
conclusion, the reason that all anti-submarine results are 
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the same is because all ships have the same defensive 
power. This is found as the greatest contributor to FER. 
2. FRIFOR vs. Kaman Encounters 
The base case model run results for Breakpoint and 
Dominance show that, against five Kamans, they are the same 
as for the bigger candidates, three and three, 
respectively. The results are, however, significantly 
poorer for Sigma and Visby, five and six, respectively. 
Freedom and Steregushchiy perform slightly better than 
Formidable and MILGEM, due to the Hellfires and better 
attributes, but not enough to change their results. Sigma 
and Visby perform poorly. The reason that Sigma has poor 
results is her low striking power, four, which is the same 
as that of Kaman. The reason for Visby’s performance is low 
defensive power, which is two due to a lack of defensive 
missiles. These two disadvantages yield similar results for 
both ships. They are all worse than bigger ships. To 
improve performance, a hardkill boost is added to these two 
ships to bring them up to a similar level with the bigger 
ships, which will be discussed later. 
Due to four Exocet SSMs on board, the striking power 
of Sigma is four. If this is increased to eight, the 
results for Breakpoint and Dominance would be three and 
four as opposed to five and six. This shows that for Sigma 
striking power is the greatest contributor to the FER. 
Defensive power and its contributor, defensive readiness, 
have no effect. This is due to discovering that its 
threshold for this encounter is three, which is Sigma’s 
defensive power. Staying power is found to have an 
insignificant effect. Targeting effectiveness, a 
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contributor to striking power, has an effect. In this 
encounter, however, it is not enough to change the results. 
Since eight is found as the threshold (she has eight 
RBS SSMs), Visby’s striking power has no effect. Visby’s 
eight SSMs make her perform slightly better than Sigma. 
This is, however, not enough to change the results. Visby’s 
greatest contributor to FER is her defensive power of two. 
It is lower than Sigma, prompting a hardkill boost by 
adding RAM. If defensive power is raised to the threshold 
of three, the results for Breakpoint and Dominance become 
four and four as opposed to five and six. Staying power has 
less effect than defensive power, but, since Visby is far 
smaller than the other candidates, it has a bigger effect 
than for Sigma. Since Visby’s results are affected by 
defensive power, defensive readiness has an effect as well, 
but not enough to change the results. Finally, since 
striking power is at the threshold already, targeting 
effectiveness is found to have no effect. 
3. FRIFOR vs. PTGs Encounters 
In these FRIFOR encounters against eight PTGs, the 
results pose similar questions and answers to those of 
Kaman encounters. If results are revisited, Freedom 
encounter requires two ships for both Breakpoint and 
Dominance. The other bigger ships require three for both. 
Sigma encounter requires five ships and six ships and Visby 
requires six and eight. Freedom’s better performance is a 
result of her ability to employ two ASUW helicopters with 
16 Hellfires; the others only employ a single helicopter. 
Sigma and Visby both employ the lighter version of Seahawk, 
which can carry only four Hellfires. Therefore, a striking 
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power of four yields poorer results. The reason that Visby 
performs even poorer than Sigma is due to her lower 
defensive power of two, which results in two more ships 
being needed than for Sigma. This is a major effect on the 
FER. Since striking power is low, targeting effectiveness 
has some effect on both ships, but not enough to change the 
results. Defensive readiness for Visby has a bigger effect 
than Sigma. This is because Visby truly suffers from low 
defensive power. When defensive readiness is improved to 
one, the result is also improved by requiring one less 
ship. Staying power is similar to Kaman encounters and has 
little effect. 
4. FRIFOR vs. PTFs Encounters 
In the center and western entrances of the Strait of 
Hormuz, where FRIFOR battles against the attacker waves of 
nine and five PTFs, respectively, the results for 
Breakpoint and Dominance provide similar insights. Against 
nine PTFs, Freedom performs slightly better than other 
bigger ships due to her two helicopters. All larger ships 
perform better than Sigma and Visby. The outcome trend is 
the same against five PTFs. 
This better performance is only one less required ship 
and that is due to the lower striking power of Sigma and 
Visby. The striking power of FRIFOR ships is the same as 
against PTGs and their defensive power is three against 
torpedoes coming from PTFs. These ships do not have 
defensive weapons against torpedoes, but are able to 
maneuver early due to detecting the surface launch. This 
gives them better defensive power than against submarines. 
Staying power has little effect, however, between Sigma and 
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Visby. Staying power is the reason why Sigma requires one 
less ship for Breakpoint against nine PTFs. Against a 
smaller group, one with five PTFs, staying power is no 
longer an advantage for Sigma and the integer results are 
the same as for Visby. Targeting effectiveness and 
defensive readiness explanations are the same as against 
PTGs. 
5. FRIFOR vs. Thondor-PTGs Encounters 
 This encounter is most challenging for FRIFOR. The 
scenario is created to understand the impact of TF 490 
changing tactics by uniting its PGFG and PTG attacker waves 
to swarm the FRIFOR in the western entrance of the Strait. 
This combined TG of ten PGFGs and PTGs fire only C-802s and 
C-701s, while FRIFOR units respond and attack with all they 
have (helicopters and ships) regardless of target-weapon 
ratio policies. In this case, the striking power of all 
FRIFOR candidates is higher than in previous encounters. 
Freedom has 16 Hellfires from two ASUW helicopters; 
Formidable and MILGEM also have 16, but that counts 
shipboard and helicopter missile combined. Steregushchiy 
has only eight Hellfires available. This is because there 
are no SSMs onboard. Sigma has eight missiles from both 
SSMs and Hellfires (four of each), while Visby has the same 
situation but with eight SSMs, giving her a total of 12 
missiles with her four airborne Hellfires.  
The results are predicted to be high numbers of 
required FRIFOR ships; however, this does not match the 
actual outcome. As a result of high striking power, Freedom 
requires only two and three ships for Breakpoint and 
Dominance, respectively, against 10 swarming OPFOR ships. 
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MILGEM and Formidable have results similar to those of 
Freedom. One more ship, however, is required for 
Breakpoint. This is due to Freedom’s better attributes, 
such as defensive readiness. This attribute stands out as 
having more effect than the others and creates the one-ship 
difference. Formidable and MILGEM have the same integer 
results, three and three, although Formidable performs 
slightly better. Steregushchiy has a striking power of 
eight and the results for her are four and five. For this 
engagement, striking power is the major contributor for 
FER. When increased to those of bigger ships, the same 
results are achieved. Defensive power and readiness does 
not have enough effect to change the results for 
Steregushchiy. Targeting effectiveness, however, when 
improved, makes an impact to the result with one less ship 
required. 
Sigma and Visby both have low defensive power and this 
is the main reason for their poor performance. For 
Breakpoint and Dominance, Sigma requires five and eight 
ships; while Visby requires seven and eleven. Due to these 
poor results, especially for Visby, hardkill boost was 
considered as a special case. Improving striking power for 
these ships has no significant effect on FER. This shows 
that, if both sides are similar to each other in terms of 
attributes, the one with better defensive power dominates. 
When Sigma’s defensive power is increased from three to 
five, the result is three fewer ships for Dominance. Even 
better than Sigma, when Visby’s defensive power is 
increased from two to three, the result improves with three 
fewer ships. These improvements of slight increase in 
defensive power show that defensive power is the critical 
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contributor to the FER. It is also discovered that 
increasing defensive readiness has some effect, while the 
remaining attributes have no impact on results. Finally, 
staying power for FRIFOR candidates is found to have an 
insignificant effect. This is because the equations for the 
smaller ships are deeply affected by lower defensive and 
striking powers than the bigger ships.  
6. Hardkill Capability Boost to Sigma and Visby 
Increasing hardkill defensive capability through 
addition of a RAM launcher to Sigma and Visby has been 
previously addressed. The results indicated that increasing 
defensive power to make it similar to that of bigger ships 
pays off, especially for Visby, which had a very low 
defensive power of two. Granted this hardkill defensive 
measure effects only three types of encounters out of 
seven, Sigma has better Breakpoint and Dominance results 
only against the swarming Thondor-PTGs combined TG. 
Previous results for Sigma were five and eight. After the 
capability boost, they improved to four and five. On the 
other hand, Visby has significantly improved against all 
three threats. The reasons for these non-improvements and 
improvements have been explained earlier. It is, however, 
essential to reiterate.  
Even with the addition of RAM and bringing the 
defensive power to eight, the reason for Sigma’s non-
improvement against Kamans and PTGs is caused by the lack 
of enough striking power. If striking power is increased to 
the levels of others and a slight improvement is made in 
defensive power, the same results could be achieved. 
Against Thondor-PTGs, the results improved with RAM 
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addition, but not by as much as in the other cases. In this 
case, increasing defensive power made an effect. This is 
because striking power was higher than before. Therefore, 
the striking power of Sigma is the greatest contributor to 
the FER, whereas defensive power is only secondary in 
importance.  
Visby differs from Sigma, as Visby improved 
tremendously with a defensive weapon addition. Against 
Kamans, the Dominance result is three fewer ships; against 
PTGs, two fewer ships, and against the Thondor-PTGs swarm, 
a large improvement from eleven ships to three ships 
resulted. Against Kamans, Visby has enough striking power, 
but almost no defensive power, resulting in poor 
performance. When RAM is added, the results are the same as 
for the bigger ships. Against PTGs, the RAM enhanced Visby 
improves by requiring two fewer ships. However, since she 
does not have enough striking power, she cannot compete 
with the larger ship alternatives. Even in these 
environments, however, defensive power is a must. Finally, 
against ten swarming ships, the results for Breakpoint and 
Dominance drop from seven and eleven to three and three. 
This is similar to the Kaman encounter where there is 
enough striking power, but almost no defensive power. 
Therefore, given striking power is present, all Visby needs 
to get to the performance level of bigger ships is enhanced 
defensive power. In summation, Visby’s defensive power has 
utmost importance for the FER, while striking power is of 
second degree importance. 
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H. HARDKILL CAPABILITY BOOST REVISITED 
The base case results showed that a hardkill 
capability of a RAM launcher is necessary for Sigma and 
Visby to boost their defensive power to those of the bigger 
ships. In order to explore further enhancements to these 
ships for creating a powerful yet less expensive 
alternative than the larger ships is now addressed. Sigma’s 
main contributor to FER is striking power; the main 
contributor for Visby is defensive power. In addition to 
the initial RAM launcher boost, to bring these two designs 
up to the level of the other candidates the following 
capabilities are considered for enhancing their 
capabilities.  
Sigma normally carries a quad Exocet SSM launcher. If 
upgraded to an octuple launcher, it will match most modern 
frigates and corvettes. Visby already has an octuple RBS 
SSM launcher. Thus, they become equally offensive. Against 
PTGs and PTFs, however, all FRIFOR ships, due to weapon-
target proportionality reasons, use their helicopters and 
the air-launched Hellfires. Since their size is an issue, 
Visby and Sigma employed a lighter version of Seahawk which 
can carry only four Hellfires or two Mk-54 torpedoes in the 
base case. Sigma and Visby are enhanced to employ MH-60R 
Seahawk, which can carry eight Hellfires and four MK-54 
torpedoes; it doubles their offensive power. A major 
assumption is that Visby receives the necessary deck 
modifications to receive a heavier helicopter. 
As seen in the Sensitivity Analysis section, having 
additional torpedoes has an insignificant effect against 
submarines. This is because striking power is not a 
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contributor to FER due to very low defensive power. Having 
eight Hellfires, however, will have direct effect against 
PTGs and PTFs. FRIFOR ships are to use SSMs against the 
PGFGs. Against the swarming attack of Thondor-PTGs, 
however, having four extra Hellfires will contribute to the 
FER. This is because FRIFOR is to use the combined power of 
ship and helicopter.  
When all these improvements are provided to Sigma and 
Visby, the results for Breakpoint and Dominance ship 
requirements are displayed in Table 24. Submarine 













Br. Do. Br. Do. Br. Do. Br. Do. 
TF 480  
5 x Kaman 5 6 3 3 5 6 3 3 
8 x PTG 5 6 3 3 6 8 3 3 
9 x PTF 5 6 4 5 6 6 4 5 
TF 490  
10 x Thondor-PTG 5 8 3 3 7 11 3 3 
5 x PTF 3 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 
Table 24.   Breakpoint and Dominance Requirements with 
Revised Hardkill Capability Boost to Sigma and Visby.   
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As can be seen, Sigma and Visby have now come to the 
level of other candidates. One minor point is that Visby 
requires one more ship for Breakpoint against five PTFs, 
since her lower staying power against torpedoes. After this 
hardkill boost, the changes in the total required number of 











TF 480 10 9 11 9 
TF 490 8 4 11 4 
TOTAL 18 13 22 13 
Table 25.   Total Number of Ships Required for Dominance 
after Revised Hardkill Boost to Sigma and Visby.  
With enhanced Sigma and Visby, the ranking changes as 
in Table 26. The required number of ships for Sigma and 
Visby without the hardkill boost is written in parenthesis. 
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Ranking Class Number of Required Ships 
1 Freedom 13 
2 Formidable 13 
3 MILGEM 13 
4 Sigma 13 (18) 
5 Visby 13 (22) 
6 Steregushchiy 14 
Table 26.   FRIFOR Candidate Ship Ranking after Revised 
Hardkill Boost to Sigma and Visby.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis is the applied art of a tactical situation 
using a mathematical method. The results generated are 
necessary insights for operational planning. An evaluation 
and comparison of FRIFOR candidates have been conducted. 
Based on an Iranian OPFOR scenario the results yield the 
conclusions summarized in this section.  
A major conclusion is that helicopters, especially the 
two on LCS, have a crucial impact on the results. 
Helicopters are an essential organic asset of a surface 
ship. With a powerful, capable and lethal helicopter, 
multi-axis threats can be addressed, given no SAM threat to 
the helicopters. Another major conclusion is that it is 
hard to prevent losses. Therefore, effectively attacking 
the enemy first is a priority. This is especially true when 
operating in an enemy’s littoral. Overwhelming the enemy 
with striking power while sustaining a credible defense is 
key to success with minimum acceptable losses. 
1. Results 
The base case results, without any hardkill boost or 
consideration of countermeasure effectiveness, indicate the 
first trend amongst the candidates. The number of ships 
required from each FRIFOR candidate for Dominance against 
the specified OPFOR threat in the base case is shown in the 
performance rankings of Table 27. The numbers in 
parentheses represent the number of required ships for 
Dominance against the attacker OPFOR. The second number in 
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parentheses is the value against two Yono class submarines 
















































Sigma (6) Visby (8) Visby 
(6,4) 
Visby (11)
Table 27.   Base Case Performance Rankings.  
When the countermeasure effectiveness attributes of 
the FRIFOR ships are accounted for as real-time 
approximations in the Salvo Equations Model, the above 



















































Sigma (6) Visby (6) Visby 
(6,4) 
Visby (6) 
Table 28.   Performance Rankings with Countermeasure 
Effectiveness.  
Table 29 shows the improvements of the results for 
Sigma and Visby with the addition of hardkill capability, 
initially and after a revision. Hardkill boost does not 
affect the submarine encounters, and only the revised 











































































































Table 29.   Performance Rankings after Initial and Revised 
Hardkill Boost to Sigma and Visby.  
Finally Table 30 shows the side-by-side rankings of 
the FRIFOR candidates along with the total number of ships 























1 Freedom 13 Freedom 10 Freedom 13 Freedom 13 
2 Formid. 13 Formid. 11 Formid. 13 Formid. 13 
3 MILGEM 13 MILGEM 11 MILGEM 13 MILGEM 13 
4 Stere. 14  Stere. 13 Stere. 14  Sigma 13 
5 Sigma 18 Sigma 15 Visby 15 Visby 13 
6 Visby 22 Visby 16 Sigma 15 Stere. 14  
Table 30.   Aggregate Rankings of FRIFOR Candidate Ships.  
2. Modeling Submarine Encounters in Salvo Equations 
Use of Salvo Equations for a submarine versus surface 
ship encounter has not previously been investigated in 
detail. What has been done in this thesis is a crude first 
approximation representation of this encounter for the 
purpose of exploring the suitability of Salvo Equations. 
Perhaps modeling ASW is an excessive stretch of the model, 
but seemingly it is a successful experiment with useful 
insights. One of the reasons for modeling this encounter is 
to increase the number of threats in realistic scenarios. 
The main reason, however, is to see what insights can be 
had by using Salvo Equations for the ship-on-submarine 
battles. The result found most insightful is that two 
conventional Kilo class submarines require six surface 
vessels for domination. This is due to lack of torpedo 
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defensive weapons. This large ship requirement argues for 
the necessity that before any littoral operation, clearing 
the submarine threat must be a high priority, before moving 
in to encounter the swarming PGFGs or small boats. 
Employing dedicated ASW surface and air assets are the best 
fit for the job.  
3. How Much Countermeasure Effectiveness is Enough? 
The answer to this question can never be found with 
high confidence. It should be emphasized that very few 
studies have adequately looked at counter-targeting and 
softkill. In this thesis, this important issue has been 
addressed and investigated. By parameterizing 
countermeasure effectiveness, this study demonstrates that 
countermeasure effectiveness is important, but how much of 
it is to be attained before an engagement is problematic 
because there is no way to assuredly quantify 
countermeasures effectiveness in an engagement. For each 
encounter by each FRIFOR candidate, the model displays the 
effect of the countermeasure effectiveness to the FER by 
changing the number of FRIFOR ships required for Dominance. 
Each FRIFOR ship has her limitations; therefore, an 
acceptable level of countermeasure has been determined for 
each encounter. This method is seen as the best way of 
approaching the question above: not quantifying the 
countermeasure attributes of the ships, but determining the 
integer number of required ships for Dominance in each 
encounter. Each FRIFOR ship’s countermeasure attributes 
have been evaluated using this technique and a real-time 
approximation of the scenario using the model has been 
achieved.  
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4. Freedom Class LCS 
The aggregate results indicate that Freedom class LCS 
is the best performer in almost all cases against the OPFOR 
within this scenario, although the larger alternatives have 
either close or the same integer results. Including the 
countermeasure effectiveness for a better real-time 
approximation of Hughes’ Salvo Model, it could be deduced 
that a total of ten LCSs (seven situated in the center and 
three in the western entrance of the Strait of Hormuz) can 
dominate the Iranian threat as described in this OPFOR 
scenario. This finding concurs with Abbott’s thesis results 
(2008), which suggested 6-10 LCS to be employed against a 
multi-axis threat, using a different analytical tool to 
explore the similar encounters. 
Lack of SSMs and ship-launched torpedoes do not hinder 
Freedom, given both helicopters are ready on the ship for 
tasking. When both helicopters are in the air, Freedom’s 
firepower is doubled, giving her an advantage to overwhelm 
the enemy. Furthermore, employing Hellfires against small 
combatants is proven effective, since WHP and Leakage Rate 
of this missile are assumed higher than Harpoon’s. Unless 
the enemy operates a SAM or PDMS firing ship, employing 
Hellfires from helicopters is the best option. The stand-
off distance of enemy’s AAW gun firing boats is 
insignificant for Hellfire firing range.  
In addition to her double helicopter capability and 
enhanced firepower, Freedom’s UAV capability, high speed 
and better signature features give her a clear advantage 
over the other FRIFOR candidates. Freedom’s RAM PDMS, when 
enhanced with the 57 mm rapid firing AAW gun, shows that a 
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SAM capability is not necessary. In addition to sufficient 
defensive power, staying power is also shown to be 
sufficient. Procurement cost, however, is an important 
consideration. Although the cost of LCS is introduced as 
$400 million, based on open-source literature, it may be 
more expensive, i.e., $500 million. 
5. Formidable Class Frigate and MILGEM Class 
Corvette 
Formidable and MILGEM are the designs that perform 
almost equal to each other. There are slightly better 
results on Formidable’s side. Both are also close to 
Freedom’s performance. With just one more ship required in 
the center of the Strait against TF 490, a total of 11 
ships are required for Formidable or MILGEM to accomplish 
the mission with countermeasure effectiveness included. 
Since Formidable is a traditional modern frigate and MILGEM 
is a modern corvette, their close performance was 
anticipated. Formidable is just a bigger-sized version of 
MILGEM with similar weapons (except for Formidable’s SAM 
capability as opposed to MILGEM’s RAM). But as to model 
values, this difference has a slight impact. Other than the 
size difference, which affects the staying power, there is 
almost no difference between Formidable and MILGEM in terms 
of Salvo Equation attributes. Similar to Freedom’s real 
cost prediction, Formidable’s approximate cost is $400 
million and MILGEM’s cost is $300 million. 
6. Steregushchiy Class Frigate 
Steregushchiy was not considered a strong candidate. 
However she has proven sufficient and overall yielded 
results just below the three ships already mentioned. In 
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the base case, 14 Steregushchiy ships are required for the 
scenario, which is just one below the requirements for the 
three ships above. With countermeasure effectiveness 
involved in the equations, eight ships in the center and 
five ships in the western entrance of the Strait, a total 
of 13 ships are enough to dominate the OPFOR. The main 
reason to require two more ships than Formidable or MILGEM 
is that Steregushchiy, similar to Freedom, lacks SSMs, and 
has no additional helicopters or air assets. Thus, against 
the swarming attack of Thondors and PTGs in the western 
part of the Strait, Steregushchiy lacks firepower to 
respond to the overwhelming number of attackers. She 
requires two more ships here. Elsewhere, she yields the 
same results as Formidable and MILGEM. Interesting, 
Steregushchiy performs slightly better than MILGEM in many 
cases, but the results, since they are integers, do not 
change. For a real-time cost approximation of this Russian 
ship, $250 million is assumed to be a safe number for 
comparison.  
7. Sigma Class Corvette 
As anticipated, a smaller candidate without a hangar 
and limited helicopter capability, Sigma performed 
relatively poorer than the bigger candidates. The analysis 
shows that her lack of a robust defensive capability, as 
well as the smaller number of offensive missiles, yielded 
worse results. For the base case, 18 ships are required for 
the mission. When her defensive capability is boosted to 
the levels of bigger ships, however, a total of 15 ships 
are needed, matching the result with just the 
countermeasure effectiveness. With an additional hardkill 
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boost, this number drops down to 13 ships, which is same as 
the bigger ships. Thus, it is shown that adding hardkill 
boost yields better results: from 18 ships down to 13 
ships.  
The addition of RAM in place of a less effective PDMS, 
increasing Exocet numbers from four to eight and upgrading 
the helicopter to a full version of Seahawk with eight 
Hellfires make Sigma as competitive as the bigger 
candidates. Sigma performs better than Visby in the base 
case. When other cases are considered, the results are 
almost the same or slightly in favor of Sigma. This is 
mainly due to Sigma being more than twice the size of 
Visby. The main point is that a cheaper and smaller asset 
with the right weapons mix can be as effective as the 
bigger and more expensive ships. Adding hardkill measures 
to Sigma affects her combat attributes in this study. For 
modeling purposes, however, this effect is omitted. As 
previously reported the unit cost of Sigma is considered to 
be around $200 million and seems a reliable estimate. 
8. Visby Class Corvette 
This ship is chosen to compare bigger ships with a 
smaller one in this scenario, specifically Freedom versus 
Visby. Although predicted competitive, the base case 
results indicate otherwise. However, when countermeasure 
effectiveness is included, the results improve from 22 down 
to 16 ships. When additional hardkill is also provided, the 
result is the same as for the other candidates. This is 
just like Sigma’s case and better than Steregushchiy. 
Although Visby has torpedoes and eight RBS SSMs, the fact 
that there is no defensive SAM or PDMS capability is her 
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main limitation for the base case. As this attribute is 
improved by adding RAM PDMS, the result changes from 22 to 
15. Furthermore, when the helicopter size is upgraded to a 
full version, the result becomes 13. Visby is certainly a 
competitive ship and, with minor changes, becomes equal to 
the bigger ships. What makes it competitive is not the 
effective weapons, but the proportionate size and power. 
Visby’s previously reported cost is $200 million and is not 
likely to change, regardless of the assumptions made in the 
introduction of a hardkill capability. Given her small size 
and low cost, she becomes the most suitable FRIFOR asset 
for this mission. She is also favored over Sigma due to 
lower operational costs. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this final section, the cost and the optimum design 
features of the evaluation of the FRIFOR designs are 
incorporated. Future study suggestions are also made. 
1. Cost 
The cost of each FRIFOR candidate has been addressed 
in the previous section. Table 31 displays the cost 
comparison of this scenario for each FRIFOR candidate with 
the countermeasure effectiveness included and the revised 
hardkill boost added to Sigma and Visby. Base case and 
initial hardkill boost costs are omitted. Hardkill boost to 







Effectiveness Revised Hardkill Boost 
Rank 







1 Sigma 15 15 x 200 = 
$3000 
Sigma 13 13 x 200 = 
$2600 
2 Visby 16 16 x 200 = 
$3200 
Visby 13 13 x 200 = 
$2600 
3 Stere. 13 13 x 250 = 
$3250 
Stere. 14 14 x 250 = 
$3500 
4 MILGEM 11 11 x 300 = 
$3300 
MILGEM 13 13 x 300 = 
$3900 
5 Formid. 11 11 x 400 = 
$4400 
Formid. 13 13 x 400 = 
$5200 
6 Freedom 10 10 x 500 = 
$5000 
Freedom 13  13 x 500 = 
$6500 
Table 31.   Cost comparison of FRIFOR Candidates.  
Without considering the hardkill boost, simply 
applying the countermeasure effectiveness, which is already 
built in the ships, the results indicate that the first 
four candidates are clearly cheaper to acquire for the 
mission in the Strait of Hormuz. With the introduction of 
hardkill boost to Sigma and Visby, without even accounting 
for the countermeasure effectiveness, the first two 
candidates, Sigma and Visby, are clearly the optimum 
choices for acquisition. The main recommendation is the 
acquisition of cheaper assets. Although it requires more 
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numbers to buy for the mission accomplishment, the overall 
cost is cheaper. Another conclusion is that the medium 
sized ships, Steregushchiy or MILGEM, are also options for 
a small increase in the overall cost. This satisfies the 
big picture concerns, such as stand-alone sustainment, 
longer on-station times and less susceptibility to higher 
sea states.  
It is clear that Freedom is the best performer. Her 
high procurement cost, however, makes her the least cost-
effective candidate. Formidable and MILGEM, performing 
almost the same, have a major gap in unit procurement cost. 
This, therefore, makes Formidable not as cost-effective. 
The overall requirement for MILGEM is less than 
Steregushchiy. The cost difference, however, also makes 
Steregushchiy an alternative to MILGEM. Hence, for a medium 
size, the more cost-effective candidates are MILGEM and 
Steregushchiy. If the sustainment concerns are omitted, the 
best cost performers are Sigma and Visby. Sigma is more 
than twice the size of Visby making her a more sustainable 
candidate. Visby’s lower operational costs, as well as fast 
speed and stealth features make her a competitive option. 
In the end, this is a combat analysis and one has to take 
into consideration that bigger ships have more of a value 
for sustainment reasons. Therefore, medium size ships, such 
as MILGEM and Steregushchiy, look attractive due to 
increased sustainment, station time, and sea state 
endurance. 
2. Optimum Design 
For an optimum design consideration, in addition to an 
octuple SSM launcher, the best weapons mix is an AAW gun, 
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76 mm or 57 mm, with RAM PDMS. A full-size helicopter is 
also necessary to deliver Hellfires against swarming 
attackers. For operational fitness, if the ship has no 
hangar, then a mother ship for the helicopter should be 
considered for logistic support. If SSMs are not carried, 
then a double helicopter capability is a must. Since this 
requires a hangar, a bigger size ship is needed, which in 
turn increases the cost. If there is not a double 
helicopter capability, ship-launched torpedoes are also 
required.  
An optimum design requires a balance between the three 
major attributes of the Salvo Equations: striking, 
defensive, and staying powers. Only with this balance, and 
a minimum cost, can an optimum design be foreshadowed. This 
optimum design best fits the MILGEM corvette. With her 76 
mm gun, RAM, octuple Harpoon launcher, ship launched 
torpedoes, sufficient stealth features, and a hangar with a 
full size helicopter, MILGEM is the best fit for this 
mission with the lowest total procurement cost and highest 
overall effectiveness. 
3. Future Study 
The Salvo Equations Model is limited to some extent 
for enhanced warfare modeling. Different aspects of warfare 
cannot be easily modeled due to the mathematical nature of 
the model. A further study on this scenario with other 
analytical tools is recommended. This effort should add the 
omitted Iranian threats, such as shore-based mobile C-802 
launchers and recently procured Chinese impact mines. 
Along with the Hughes Salvo Equations Model, a 
simulation software tool and intelligent experimental 
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design may be used to visualize the scenario and further 
explore the value of ship attributes. MANA (Map Aware Non-
Uniform Automata) is an agent-based distillation model, one 
of the common simulation and modeling tools used by 
military operation analysts. It was developed by New 
Zealand DTA (Defense Technology Agency). This model is very 
helpful in simulating behaviors of “agents”, e.g., ship and 
helicopter, and would provide great visual and statistical 
results for the given scenario. The aim of running a MANA 
model, using the same scenario, is to verify or challenge 
the results of the Hughes Salvo Equations Model using a 
different analytical approach. 
Another visual tool to model the same scenario is the 
commercial game, Harpoon 3 Advanced Naval Warfare, by 
Matrix Publishing Company. A tactical scenario editor is 
built in to create a custom-made scenario. This can easily 
accommodate the Strait of Hormuz scenario and provide a 
visual realization of this study within a short period of 
time. Requiring no more skills than a strategy and 
simulation game player, the aim is to apply real-time 
scenarios to a game editor and quickly determine results 
for decision makers. 
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APPENDIX A. FRIENDLY FORCE ASSETS 
A. FREEDOM CLASS LCS FLIGHT 0 
USS Freedom (LCS-1), built by Lockheed Martin in 
Marinette Marine, Wisconsin, was commissioned on 8 November 
2008. USS Forth Worth (LCS-3) is due to be commissioned in 
2013. A total of 55 LCSs is proposed. 
 
Displacement 3089 tons, full load 
Dimensions 115.3 m x 13.1 m x 3.9 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery CODAG; 2 GT (96550 hp), 2 Diesels (17160 hp), 4 
Waterjets 
Speed, Range 45 Kts, 3500 NM at 18 Kts  
Complement 50+25 mission package crew and aircrew 
Missiles 1 RAM RIM-116, 21-cell Mk 99 launcher, Passive 
IR/anti-radiation homing to 5.2 NM at 2.5 Mach, 
Warhead 9.1 kg 
Guns 1 57 mm/70 Mk 2, 220 rds/min to 9 NM, shell 
weight 2.4 kg, 4 12.7 mm MG 
Countermeasures 2 SKWS/SRBOC decoy launcher, ESM/ECM 
Helicopters 2 MH-60 R/S Helicopter or 1 MH-60 R/S and 3 MQ-8B 
Fire Scout VTUAVs 
Notes 7 Mission Modules (3 MW, 2 ASW, and 2 ASUW) are 
to be used interchangeable on LCS. Capability to 
launch and recover manned and unmanned boats 
Table 32.   Freedom Class LCS Characteristics. 
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Figure 7.   USS Freedom-1 (LCS-1), from JFS. 
 
Figure 8.   USS Freedom-2 (LCS-1), from JFS. 
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B. FORMIDABLE (PROJECT DELTA) CLASS FRIGATE (FFGH) 
RSS Formidable (F-68), built by DCN, Lorient for 
Singapore Navy, was commissioned on 5 May 2007. Five more 
of the same class (F-69 through 73) have been built by 
Singapore SB and Marine, commissioned between 2008 and 
2009. 
Displacement 3200 tons, full load 
Dimensions 114 m x 16 m x 5 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery CODAD; 4 Diesels (48276 hp), 2 shafts, bow 
thruster 
Speed, Range 27 Kts, 4000 NM at 15 Kts  
Complement 71+15 aircrew 
Missiles SSM: 8 Harpoon, active radar homing to 70 NM at 
0.9 Mach, Warhead 227 kg. SAM: 4 octuple Sylver 
VLS for MBDA Aster 15, command guidance active 
radar homing to 8.1 NM anti-missile, to 16.2 NM 
anti-aircraft, 32 missiles 
Guns 1 76 mm/62, 120 rds/min to 8.7 NM, shell weight 6 
kg, 2 20 mm MG, 2 12.7 mm MG 
Torpedoes 6 324 mm tubes, A 244/S Mod 3, active/passive 
homing to 3.8 NM at 33 Kts, Warhead 34 kg 
Countermeasures 3 NGDS 8-barrelled decoy launcher, ESM 
Helicopters 1 S-70B Seahawk 
Notes Derived from La Fayette design. Two of the four 
VLS launcher can launch longer range Aster 30 SAM 
Table 33.   Formidable Class Frigate Characteristics. 
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Figure 9.   RSS Formidable (F-68), from JFS. 
 
Figure 10.   RSS Tenacious (F-71), from JFS. 
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C. MILGEM CLASS CORVETTE (FSGH) 
TCG Heybeliada (F-511), built by Istanbul Naval 
Shipyard for Turkish Navy, launched on 27 September 2008 
and is due to be commissioned in 2011. TCG Buyukada (F-512) 
is to be commissioned in 2014. Six other ships are 
proposed. 
 
Displacement 2000 tons, full load 
Dimensions 99 m x 14.4 m x 3.6 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery CODAG; 2 Diesels (11750 hp), 1 GT (20500 hp), 2 
shafts 
Speed, Range 29 Kts, 3500 NM at 15 Kts  
Complement 93 
Missiles SSM: 8 Harpoon, active radar homing to 70 NM at 
0.9 Mach, Warhead 227 kg. SAM: 1 RAM RIM-116, 21-
cell Mk 49 launcher, Passive IR/anti-radiation 
homing to 5.2 NM at 2.5 Mach, Warhead 9.1 kg 
Guns 1 76 mm/62, 120 rds/min to 8.7 NM, shell weight 6 
kg, 2 12.7 mm MG 
Torpedoes 4 324 mm tubes 
Countermeasures TBA, ESM/ECM 
Helicopters 1 S-70B Seahawk 
Notes 8 ASW and OPVs are proposed with a follow up of 4 
slightly larger F-100 class frigates, the 
predecessors of TF-2000 (Turkish Frigate) 
Table 34.   MILGEM Class Corvette Characteristics. 
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Figure 11.   TCG Heybeliada-1 (F-511), from JFS. 
 
Figure 12.   TCG Heybeliada-2 (F-511), from JFS. 
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D. STEREGUSHCHIY CLASS (PROJECT 20380) FRIGATE (FFGH) 
RS Steregushchiy (F-530), built at Severnaya, St. 
Petersburg for Russian Navy, was commissioned on 14 
November 2007. Four more of this design are being built and 
to be commissioned between 2010 and 2011. Two more are 
proposed. 
 
Displacement 2200 tons, full load 
Dimensions 104.5 m x 11.1 m x 3.7 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery CODAD; 4 Diesels (24000 hp), 2 shafts 
Speed, Range 26 Kts, 3500 NM at 14 Kts  
Complement 100 
Missiles 1 CADS-N-1 Kashtan, twin 30 mm Gatling combined 
with 8 SA-N-11 Grisson, laser beam guidance to 
4.4 NM, warhead 9 kg, 9000 rds/min for guns 
Guns 1 100 mm, 80 rds/min to 11.6 NM, shell weight 
15.6 kg, 2 30 mm/65 AK 630 CIWS, 3000 rds/min, 2 
14.5 mm MG 
Torpedoes 8 324 mm tubes, anti-torpedo active/passive 
homing to 2.7 NM, warhead 70 kg 
Countermeasures 4 PK 1- launchers, ESM/ECM 
Helicopters 1 Ka-27 Helix 
Notes Space is provided for 8 SS-N-25 SSMs 




Figure 13.   RS Steregushchiy-1 (F-530), from JFS. 
 
Figure 14.   RS Steregushchiy-2 (F-530), from JFS. 
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E. SIGMA CLASS CORVETTE (FSGH) 
KRI Diponegoro (F-365), built at Royal Schelde, 
Vlissengen for Indonesian Navy, was commissioned on 2 July 
2007. Based on the Dutch Sigma design, three other ships 
(F-366 through 368) were built in Netherlands and 
commissioned between 2007 and 2009. Two more are proposed. 
 
Displacement 1692 tons, full load 
Dimensions 90.7 m x 13 m x 3.6 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery 2 Diesels (21725 hp), 2 shafts 
Speed, Range 28 Kts, 4000 NM at 18 Kts  
Complement 80 
Missiles SSM: 4 MM 40 Exocet Block II, inertial cruise 
active radar homing to 40 NM at 0.9 Mach, warhead 
165 kg. SAM: 2 quad Tetral launcher, MBDA 
Mistral, IR homing to 2.2 NM, warhead 3kg 
Guns 1 76 mm/62, 120 rds/min to 8.7 NM, shell weight 6 
kg, 2 20 mm MG 
Torpedoes 6 324 mm tubes, MU-90, active/passive homing to 
13.5 NM at 29/50 Kts 
Countermeasures 2 Terma SKWS launcher, ESM/ECM 
Helicopters Platform only 
Notes Built for coastal security operations 






Figure 15.   KRI Diponegoro (F-365), from JFS. 
 
Figure 16.   KRI Sultan Hasanuddin (F-366), from JFS. 
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F. VISBY CLASS CORVETTE (FSGH) 
HSWMS Visby (K-31), built at Karlskronavarvet for 
Swedish Navy, was commissioned on 12 July 2006. Four more 
ships (K-32 through 35) were commissioned between 2006 and 
2008 in the Swedish Navy. 
 
Displacement 620 tons, full load 
Dimensions 73 m x 10.4 m x 2.4 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery CODOG, 4 GT (21760 hp), 2 Diesels (3536 hp), 2 
Waterjets, bow thruster 
Speed 35 Kts, 15 Kts (diesels)  
Complement 43 
Missiles 8 RBS 15 Mk 3, inertial guidance active radar 
homing to 110 NM at 0.9 Mach, warhead 200 kg 
Guns 1 57 mm/70 Mk 3, 220 rds/min to 9.3 NM, shell 
weight 2.4 kg, 2 12.7 mm MG 
Torpedoes 4 400 mm tubes, Type-45, anti-submarine/surface, 
wire guided active homing to 10.8 NM at 25 Kts, 
warhead 45 kg 
Countermeasures Rheinmetal decoy launcher, ESM/ECM, MCMV 
Helicopters Platform only 
Notes SAM provision is TBC, but most likely South 
African Umkhonto 16-cell VLS, inertial guidance 
with mid-course guidance and IR homing to 6.5 NM 
at 2.4 Mach, Warhead 23 kg  




Figure 17.   HSWMS Visby (K-31), from JFS. 
 
Figure 18.   HSWMS Helsingborg (K-32), from JFS. 
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G. SIKORSKY MH-60R SEAHAWK 
MH-60R Seahawk is built for the U.S. Navy to replace 
the aging SH-60B/F fleet. It will serve as the future 
tactical helicopter operated from surface combatants. 
Entered in the frontline service in 2006, MH-60R is 
equipped with a full-spectrum of airborne sensor suits, 
equipments and weapons for principal naval warfare. Recent 
product improvements to the helicopter include the fourth 
weapons station, allowing a total of eight AGM-114 Hellfire 
missiles or four Mk-54 torpedoes. Besides the modern 
sensors  and lethal weapons load, having an operational 
speed of 145 knots and a range of 450 NM, MH-60R Seahawk is 
one of the most effective tactical helicopters operated 
from ships.  
 
Figure 19.   MH-60R Seahawk, from JFS. 
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APPENDIX B. OPPOSING FORCE ASSETS 
A. KILO CLASS (PROJECT 877 EKM) SUBMARINE (SSK) 
Three Kilo class submarines were built for Iranian 
Navy by the Admiralty Yard in St. Petersburg and 
commissioned in 1992, 1993 and 1996.  
 
Displacement 3076 tons submerged 
Dimensions 72.6 m x 9.9 m x 6.6 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery 2 Diesels (3650 hp), 1 electric motor (5500 hp), 
1 shaft 
Speed, Range 17 Kts dived, 6000 NM at 7 Kts snorting  
Complement 53 
Torpedoes 6 533 mm tubes, combination of TEST-71/96 wire 
guided active/passive homing to 8.1 NM at 40 Kts, 
warhead 220 kg and 53-65 passive wake homing to 
10.3 NM at 45 Kts, warhead 350 kg. Total of 18 
torpedoes. 24 mines in lieu of torpedoes 
Notes Chinese YJ-1 or Russian Novator Alfa SSMs and SA-
N-10 SAMs may be fitted during the planned 
upgrade refit of the boats 










Figure 20.   Iranian Kilo Class Submarine-1, from JFS. 
 
Figure 21.   Iranian Kilo Class Submarine-2, from JFS. 
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B. YONO CLASS (IS 120) COASTAL SUBMARINE (SSC) 
Based on the North Korean design, a total of five 
submarines are claimed to have been built in Iran and one 
more is under construction. These are likely to be 
involvement with North Korea. First noticed in 2004, little 
is known about these boats.  
 
Displacement 123 tons submerged 
Dimensions 29 m x 2.8 m x 2.5 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery Diesel-electric 
Complement 32 
Torpedoes 2 533 mm tubes 
Table 39.   Kilo Class Submarine Characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Iranian Yono Class Submarine, from JFS. 
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C. KAMAN (COMBATTANTE II) CLASS FPB (PGFG) 
Ten boats were built by CMN in Cherbourg, France for 
Iranian Navy and commissioned between 1977 and 1981. Three 
more of this class were built by Iran at Bandar Anzali on 
Caspian coast and commissioned in 2004, 2006 and 2008.  
 
Displacement 275 tons full load 
Dimensions 47 m x 7.1 m x 1.9 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery 4 Diesels (12280 hp), 4 shafts 
Speed, Range 38 Kts, 2000 NM at 15 Kts  
Complement 31 
Missiles 2 or 4 C-802, active radar homing to 66 NM at 0.9 
Mach, warhead 165 kg 
Guns 1 76 mm/62, 85 rds/min to 8.7 NM, shell weight 6 
kg, 1 40 mm/70, 300 rds/min to 6.6 NM. Some have 
23 m or 20 mm gun in place of 40 mm 2 12.7 mm MG 
Notes SA-7 portable SAMs maybe embarked. Latter built 
boats are stationed in Caspian Sea 















Figure 23.   Iranian Kaman Class FPB-1, from JFS. 
 
Figure 24.   Iranian Kaman Class FPB-2, from JFS. 
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D. THONDOR (HOUDONG) CLASS FPB (PGFG) 
Ten boats were built for Iranian Navy at Zhanjiang 
Shipyard, China and commissioned in two batches in 1994 and 
1996.  
 
Displacement 205 tons full load 
Dimensions 38.6 m x 6.8 m x 2.7 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery 3 Diesels (8025 hp), 3 shafts 
Speed, Range 35 Kts, 800 NM at 30 Kts  
Complement 28 
Missiles 4 C-802, active radar homing to 66 NM at 0.9 
Mach, warhead 165 kg 
Guns 2 30 mm AK 230, 2 23 mm MG 
Notes A similar design to Chinese Huangfen (Osa 1) 
Table 41.   Thondor Class FPB Characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 25.   Iranian Thondor Class FPB, from JFS. 
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E. C-14 CLASS MISSILE BOAT (PTG) 
Nine boats were built by China State Shipbuilding 
Corporation and delivered starting 2000. Five boats are 
likely to carry short range Chinese FL-10 SSMs; while the 
remaining four have the Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL). 
 
Displacement 17 tons 
Dimensions 13.7 m x 4.8 m x 0.7 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery 2 Diesels (2300 hp), 2 shafts 
Speed 50 Kts  
Missiles 4 FL-10 
Guns 1 20 mm, 1 12.7 mm MG 
Notes A catamaran-hull design 
Table 42.   C-14 Class Boat Characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Iranian C-14 Class Missile Boat, from JFS. 
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F. MK 13 CLASS MISSILE BOAT (PTG) 
Ten boats were built by China and delivered in 2006. 
 
Displacement TBA 
Length 14 m  
Speed TBA  
Missiles 2 FL-10 
Torpedoes 2 324 mm tubes 
Notes Armed with both SSMs and torpedoes 
Table 43.   Mk 13 Class Boat Characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 27.   Iranian Mk 13 Class Missile Boat, from JFS. 
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G. PEYKAAP II (IPS 16 MOD) CLASS MISSILE BOAT (PTG) 
Based on North Korean design of Peykaap I, it is 
estimated that 25 boats have been built recently by Iran. 
 
Displacement 14 tons 
Dimensions 17 m x 3.8 m x 0.7 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery 2 Diesels (2400 hp), 2 shafts 
Speed 52 Kts  
Missiles 2 C-701 Kosar 
Notes A slightly larger missile version of stealthy 
design Peykaap I torpedo boat 
Table 44.   Peykaap II Class Boat Characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 28.   Iranian Peykaap II Class Missile Boat, from JFS. 
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H. TIR (IPS 18) CLASS TORPEDO BOAT (PTF) 
Ten of this class were built in North Korea and 
delivered in 2002.  
 
Displacement 28 tons 
Dimensions 21.1 m x 5.8 m x 0.9 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery 3 Diesels (3600 hp) 
Speed 52 Kts  
Guns 1 12.7 mm MG 
Torpedoes 2 533 mm tubes 
Notes Anti-surface ships role torpedoes are carried 
Table 45.   Tir Class Boat Characteristics. 
 
 




I. PEYKAAP I (IPS 16) CLASS TORPEDO BOAT (PTF) 
Fifteen of this class were built in North Korea and 
delivered in 2002.  
 
Displacement 14 tons 
Dimensions 16.3 m x 3.8 m x 0.7 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery 2 Diesels (2400 hp), 2 shafts 
Speed 52 Kts  
Guns 1 12.7 mm MG 
Torpedoes 2 324 mm tubes 
Notes A stealthy design carrying ship-disabling 
torpedoes 
Table 46.   Peykaap I Class Boat Characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 30.   Iranian Peykaap I Class Torpedo Boat, from JFS. 
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J. GAHJAE CLASS SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE TORPEDO BOAT (PTF) 
Three of these boats were built in North Korea as 
Taedong-C semi-submersible boats and delivered in 2002.  
 
Displacement 7 tons 
Dimensions 15 m x 3 m x 0.7 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Speed 50 Kts  
Torpedoes 2 324 mm tubes 
Notes The stealthy design appears to be based on 
Peykaap I design. The concept of operations is a 
high speed surface approach to a target before 
submerging to a depth of 3 m. to conduct the 
attack using a snorting mast 




Figure 31.   Iranian Gahjae Class Semi-Submersible Torpedo Boat, 
from JFS. 
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K. KAJAMI CLASS SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE TORPEDO BOAT (PTF) 
Three of these boats were built in North Korea as 
Taedong-B high-speed infiltration crafts and delivered in 
2002.  
 
Displacement 30 tons 
Length 21 m 
Speed 50 Kts  
Torpedoes 2 324 mm tubes 
Notes Little is known about the design. The concept of 
operations is a high speed surface approach to a 
target before submerging to a depth of 3 m. to 
conduct the attack using a snorting mast 
Table 48.   Kajami Class Semi-Submersible Boat 
Characteristics. 
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APPENDIX C. SALVO EQUATIONS ATTRIBUTE CALCULATIONS 
A. FRIFOR ATTRIBUTE CALCULATION DETAILS 
1. Defensive Power Calculations 
Defensive power of all FRIFOR ships against submarines 
is two, due to lack of anti-torpedo defensive weapons. Only 
ASW defensive maneuvers are present for defensive power. 
Torpedo countermeasures of the surface ships are accounted 
for in the countermeasure effectiveness attributes. Against 
PTFs, all FRIFOR ships have a defensive power of three. 
Similar to the explanation for submarines, they lack 
defensive weapons. FRIFOR’s ships early detection 
capability and better defensive maneuvers against PTFs give 
them a higher defensive power than against submarines. 
Defensive power of FRIFOR candidates against missile firing 













Defensive Weapon Values 
FRIFOR 
SAM/PDMS Value Gun Value CIWS Value Total 
Freedom 21 cell 
RAM 
7 57 mm 2 - 0 9 
Formid. 32 cell 
VLS  
8 76 mm 1 - 0 9 
MILGEM 21 cell 
RAM 
7 76 mm 1 - 0 8 
Stere. 8 tube 
IR 
2.7 100 mm 1 4 4 7.7 
Sigma 8 tube 
IR/RAM 
2/7 76 mm 1 - 0 3/8 
Visby -/RAM 0/7 57 mm 2 - 0 2/9 
Table 49.   FRIFOR Anti-Missile Defensive Power Calculations. 
All FRIFOR ships, except for Formidable and Visby, 
have IR missiles. Their defensive value is assumed 1/3 of 
the number of missiles available, except for Sigma, which 
is assumed at 1/4 due to her less effective system. For 
Formidable, the value is the number of FC Channels, which 
is four, and fairly becomes 1/4 of the number of missiles. 
57 mm guns on Freedom and Visby are rapid firing and are 
assumed twice the value of the other guns. Each of regular 
guns and CIWS are assumed to effectively shoot down one 
incoming enemy missile. Steregushchiy has four CIWS; thus, 
with the combined CIWS and IR PDMS system, she is an 
effective defender. For the initial hardkill boost to Sigma  
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and Visby and with the addition of RAM, the value changes 
from three to eight for Sigma and from two to nine for 
Visby. 
2. Staying Power Calculations 
Staying power of all FRIFOR ships against submarine 
launched heavyweight torpedoes is one. Thus, it is assumed 
that one torpedo disables the surface ship from its role in 
the Salvo Exchange. Lightweight torpedoes and long-range 
SSMs (C-802s) are assumed to have the same disabling 
effect. This is because of their similar size of warheads 
and SSM’s possibly less lethal hit-point on its target. 
Short-range SSMs (all assumed to employ C-701s) are of a 
lesser lethal effect from PTGs; therefore, staying power 
against PTGs is higher. Staying power of FRIFOR candidates 
against missile and torpedo firing enemy surface ships, 
PGFGs, PTGs and PTFs, are detailed in Table 50. 
 
Staying Power Values 
FRIFOR Length Coefficient
Tonnage 
Coefficient Against C-802/ 
324 mm torp. 
Against 
C-701 
Freedom 1.6 5 1.9 2.9 
Formidable 1.6 5.2 1.9 2.9 
MILGEM 1.4 3.2 1.5 2.3 
Steregushchiy 1.4 3.5 1.6 2.5 
Sigma 1.2 2.7 1.4 2.1 
Visby 1 1 1 1.5 
Table 50.   FRIFOR Anti-Surface Ship Staying Power 
Calculations. 
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 These calculations are based on Visby length and 
tonnage. The length and tonnage coefficients of Visby are 
assumed one. The rest of FRIFOR’s values are calculated by 
taking the ratio of them to Visby and dividing their 
lengths and tonnages with Visby’s. Visby’s staying power 
against C-802/lightweight torpedoes is assumed one and 
against C-701s is assumed 1.5. The following formula is 
used to calculate the FRIFOR’s staying power against C-
802/lightweight torpedoes.  
Staying Power = Leng. Coef. * 0.9 + Ton. Coef. * 0.1.  (10)  
Basically, length is 90% of the staying power; 
whereas, tonnage is 10%. Against C-701s, the former staying 
power value is simply multiplied by 1.5. 
B. OPFOR ATTRIBUTE CALCULATION DETAILS 
1. TG 480.04 Striking Power Calculations 
TG 480.04 is composed of 10 PTGs, two Mk 13, two C-14 
and six Peykaap II. Due to OPDEF, one C-14 and one Peykaap 
II are unavailable; therefore, eight PTGs are included in 
the calculations. Mk 13 normally carries two FL-10 and two 
lightweight torpedoes; C-14 carries four FL-10; and Peykaap 
carries two C-701s. For ease of modeling, however, it is 
assumed that they carry four, four, and two C-701s, 
respectively. Therefore, the striking power of TG 480.04 is 
calculated in the following formula. 
Striking Power = (Number of 4 C-701 carriers * 4 + Number 
of 2 C-701 carriers * 2) / Total number of ships      (11)  
Eight boats, three of which carry four missiles and 
five boats that carry two missiles, yield a result of 2.8 
for striking power. 
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2. TG 490.01-02 Striking Power Calculations 
TG 490.01-02 is a combined TG of Thondor PGFGs and 
various classes of PTGs. TG 490.01 is composed of four 
Thondors, one is unavailable due to OPDEF and each has a 
striking power of four. TG 490.02 is composed of eight 
PTGs, three C-14 and five Peykaap II, and, due to OPDEF, 
one Peykaap II is unavailable; therefore, seven PTGs are 
included in the calculations. C-14 is assumed to have a 
striking power of four and Peykaap II has a striking power 
of two. Striking power of TG 490.02 was calculated in the 
previous section using the same formula. The result is 2.9. 
This striking power is combined with that of TG 490.01 in 
the following formula. 
Striking Power of TG 490.01-02 = (Number of Thondors * 4 + 
Number of TG 490.02 * Striking power of TG 490.02) / Total 
number of ships                                     (12)  
 There are three Thondors and seven PTGs; therefore, 
the result becomes 3.2. 
3. TG 490.01-02 Defensive Power Calculations 
Defensive power of Thondor is two, while the PTGs have 
a value of one. The formula below gives the result of 1.3 
Defensive Power = (Number of Thondors * 2 + Number of TG 
490.02 * 1) / Total number of ships                 (13)  
4. TG 490.01-02 Staying Power Calculations 
Against Hellfires, staying power of Thondor is 1.5 
while the PTGs have a value of one. The formula below gives 
the result of 1.2. 
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Staying Power = (Number of Thondors * 1.5 + Number of TG 
490.02 * 1) / Total number of ships                 (14)  
Against the combination of FRIFOR Hellfires and SSMs, 
this value changes to approximately 1.1. The number is 
approximately the same for all ships attacking with a 
combination of missiles. A sample calculation is the 
following: Visby attacks with eight SSMs and four 
Hellfires, a total of 12 for striking power. The staying 
power of Thondor changes against Hellfires and SSMs. This 
combination, however, does not affect PTGs, which all have 
a value of one. So for Visby against TG 490.01-02, the 
staying power of OPFOR is the following formula. 
Staying Power = ((Staying power against Hellfires * Number 
of Hellfires + Staying power against SSMs * Number of SSMs) 
/ Number of FRIFOR missiles * Number of Thondors + Staying 
power against missiles * Number of PTGs) / Number of OPFOR 
ships.                                              (15)  
Thondor’s staying power against Hellfires is 1.5 and 
against SSMs it is one. The number of FRIFOR missiles is 12 
and there are total of three Thondors. There are seven PTGs 
and, no matter what, the staying power is one. Thus, with a 
total number of ten OPFOR ships, the overall staying power 
of TG 490.01-02 becomes 1.1. 
C. FRIFOR VS. TG 490.01-02 THONDOR-PTG ATTRIBUTE 
CALCULATION DETAILS 
In this encounter, PGFGs and PTGs attack in a combined 
TG, while the FRIFOR ships respond with all offensive 
weapons combined. Freedom and Steregushchiy can only 
respond with helicopters and, therefore, with Hellfires. 
The remaining FRIFOR ships attack with both SSMs and 
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Hellfires. The fact that FRIFOR and OPFOR offensive weapons 
might be a mix of FRIFOR SSMs and Hellfires or OPFOR C-802 
and C-701 SSMs, the staying power of OPFOR and FRIFOR might 
change as mentioned in the previous section. Depending on 
each FRIFOR ship, this is homogenized. Besides the staying 
power, WHP and Leakage Rate are also subject to change due 
to the weapons mix and these values are homogenized as 
well. Finally, for FRIFOR, since the OPFOR is a mixture of 
ships, the targeting effectiveness and defensive readiness 
are also homogenized. 
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